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Under the Supreme Court's recent decision in Fdends ofthe Earth,
Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., a plaintiff in an
action filed in federal court under the citizen suit provision' of the Clean
Water Act (CWA) may establish standing to sue on the basis of
recreational or aesthetic injury. 2 Laidlaw held that a plaintiff in a CWA
citizen suit in federal court, seeking an injunction and civil penalties
against a defendant who is discharging pollutants into a body of water,
can establish the injury in fact element of federal standing to sue
requirements by showing that the plaintiff uses an area "affected" by the
defendant's "challenged activity" and that the defendant's actions have
"lessened" the plaintiff's recreational or aesthetic enjoyment of the
"affected" area. 3 However, the Court in Laidlaw did not define
"affected" area and "challenged activity" for purposes of this principle.
Courts in future CWA citizen suits against polluters of a water body,
therefore, will have to determine if the plaintiffs in such suits have
established recreational or aesthetic injury in fact under Laidlaw in
varying factual situations.
Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law.
*
School; B.S. 1968, Cornell University.
I.
33 u.s.c. § 1365 (2000).
2.
528 u.s. 167, 183 (2000).
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In future CWA citizen suits, federal courts also will have to interpret
an additional holding in Laidlaw, which states that private individuals
who live "nearby" a polluted river and who seek injunctive relief against
an alleged polluter of the river establish imminent future recreational and
aesthetic injury when they allege and establish two things. 4 The plaintiffs
satisfy federal standing to sue requirements, under this additional holding
in Laidlaw, when they allege and establish (1) that the defendant's
pollution of the river has caused them to refrain from using the "nearby"
river for recreational purposes because of their reasonable concerns
about the effects of the defendant's pollutant discharges into the river, and
(2) that they would use the river for recreation if the defendant was not
discharging pollutants into ie Because the Laidlaw decision does not
define "nearby" for purposes of this principle, federal courts in future
CWA citizen suits against polluters of a water body, that involve facts
different than those in Laidlaw, face uncertainty as to what types of harm
to recreational and aesthetic interests will satisfy federal standing to sue
requirements in such suits.
Although Laidlaw established federal constitutional standing to sue
principles for recreational and aesthetic injury in fact that should be
applicable in actions brought in federal court under the citizen suit
provision of the Clean Air Act (CAA), Laidlaw's standing principles may
have to be applied differently in cases involving air pollution rather than
water pollution. 6 The distinctions arise because the area "affected" by a
defendant's emissions of air pollutants may be defined on the basis of
factors that differ from the factors utilized to define the area "affected"
by discharges of pollutants into a body of water.
This Article will analyze the federal standing to sue requirements
that have to be satisfied by a plaintiff in a CWA or CAA citizen suit
against a polluter of a water body or outdoor ambient air whose pollutant
discharges or emissions allegedly cause injury to the plaintiff's
recreational or aesthetic enjoyment of a part of the environment, with
particular emphasis on the Laidlawdecision. 7

4.
Id at 184, 186-87.
5.
Seeidat 181-85.
6.
Seeid
7.
This Article will not analyze standing to sue based upon injury to a person's economic
and health interests that may be caused by a defendant's discharges of pollutants into a body of
water or into the outdoor ambient air.
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GENERAL FEDERAL STANDING TO SUE REQUIREMENTS

Federal standing to sue requirements for a plaintiff in a suit filed in
a federal court seek to ensure that the plaintiff has "such a 'personal stake
in the outcome of the controversy,' . . . as to ensure that 'the dispute
sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversary context and in
a form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution."'8 The
standing requirement also "tends to assure that the legal questions
presented to the court will be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a
debating society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic
appreciation of the consequences of judicial action." 9
In any suit filed in a federal court, a plaintiff is required to satisfy
both constitutionally based standing to sue requirements and "prudential"
standing to sue requirements. 10 A plaintiff invoking federal jurisdiction
has the burden of establishing all of these standing requirements as "an
indispensable part of the plaintiff's case," not as "mere pleading
requirements;" 11 and a plaintiff in federal court "must demonstrate
standing separately for each form of relief sought."' 2 The federal constitutional standing to sue requirements, which derive from the "case" or
"controversy" jurisdictional prerequisite of Article III of the United
States Constitution,' 3 are "immutable requirements"' 4 that cannot be
changed by either the federal judiciary or by the United States
Congress. 15 On the other hand, federal prudential standing to sue
requirements, which are "'judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise
of federal jurisdiction,"''6 can be modified or abrogated by the
Congress.' 7
To satisfy the "irreducible constitutional minirnum"' 8 federal
standing to sue requirements, a plaintiff in a suit in a federal court "must,
generally speaking, demonstrate that he has suffered 'injury in fact,' that

8.
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 (1972) (citations omitted).
9.
Valley Forge Christian Coli. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, 454
u.s. 464,472 (1982).
I 0.
See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. I 54, 162 (1997).
II.
Lujan v. Defenders ofWiidlife, 504 U.S. 555, 56 I (I992).
I2.
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. I67, I85
(2000).
I3.
Jd at I80.
14.
Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162.
15. Jd
16. Jd (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,751 (I984)).
17. ld at I62.
18. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 ( 1992).
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the injury is 'fairly traceable' to the actions of the defendant, and that the
injury will likely be redressed by a favorable decision."' 9
The injury in fact element requires a plaintiff to "have suffered ...
an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and
particularized . . . and (b) 'actual or imminent, not "conjectural" or
"hypothetica1.""'20 There is no quantitative standard for the injury in fact
element: this element can be satisfied by an "identifiable trifle" and a
plaintiff does not have to be "significantly" affected by the defendant's
challenged activity in order for this element to be satisfied. 2 '
Furthermore, the injury in fact suffered by a plaintiff "as a result of the
putatively illegal conduct of the defendant" can be either actual injury or
"One does not have to await the
threatened [future] injury. 22
consummation of threatened injury to obtain preventive relief. If the
injury is certainly impending that is enough."23 An injury in fact that has
occurred in the past may be sufficient to satisfy the injury in fact element
when a plaintiff is seeking damages for this past injury, 24 but when a
plaintiff is seeking injunctive relief, a plaintiff must establish that he or
she presently is being injured by "continuing, present adverse effects"25
or will be injured in the imminent future. 26
The "fairly traceable" element requires a causal connection between
the injury and the defendant's challenged conduct, such that the injury is
fairly traceable to the challenged activity of the defendant and not the
result of an independent action of a third person not before the court. 27
This element only requires a plaintiff to show that there is a "substantial
likelihood" that the defendant's challenged activity caused the plaintiff's
injury, 28 and federal courts of appeal have held that the "fairly traceable"
element does not require that a causal connection be established either to
a scientific certaintY9 or to a certainty equivalent to that required by tort

19. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162.
20.
Defenders ofWJJdlife, 504 U.S. at 560.
21. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669,
689 n.l4 (1973) (citation omitted).
22. Gladstone, Realtors v. Viii. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91,99 (1979).
23. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553,593 (1923).
24.
See Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983) (presuming that past injury is
sufficient to satisfy the injury in fact element when the plaintiff is seeking damages).
25. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488,495-96 (1974).
26.
See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564-65 n.2 (1992).
27.
Jd at 560.
28. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 75 n.20 (1978).
29. Pub. Interest Research Group ofN.J., Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d
64, 72 (3d Cir. 1990), ceJt. denied, 498 U.S. 1109 (1991) ; Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v.
Watkins, 954 F.2d 974, 980 n.7 (4th Cir. 1992).
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proximate causation standards. 30 The redressability element requires that
the plaintiff show that it is '"likely,' as opposed to merely 'speculative,'
that the injury will be 'redressed by a favorable decision."' 31
Federal "[p]rudential standing requirements include: 'The general
prohibition on a litigant's raising another person's legal rights, the rule
barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately
addressed in the representative branches, and the requirement that a
plaintiff's complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law
invoked."'32 This "zone of interests" requirement mandates that a
plaintiff "establish that the injury he complains of ... falls within the
'zone of interests' sought to be protected by the statutory provision
whose violation forms the legal basis for the complaint."33 An exception
to the prudential requirement that a person only has standing to sue based
upon personal injury to the plaintiff, permits an organization to have
standing in federal court to assert interests of particular, identified
members of the organization when these members of the organization
would have standing to sue in their own right, the interests asserted by
the organization in the lawsuit are germane to the organization's
purposes, and neither the claims asserted nor the relief requested in the
litigation require the personal participation of these members in the
litigation. 34
II.

PROCEDURAL METHODS TO CHALLENGE A PLAINTIFF'S STANDING
TO SUE IN A FEDERAL COURT

A defendant in federal court who seeks to have a case dismissed
before trial on grounds of the plaintiff's lack of standing should file a
motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, not a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Although a plaintiff's allegations in the
complaint "must be true and capable of proof of trial,"35 if a defendant
challenges the plaintiff's standing to sue by filing a pre-trial motion to
30. Powell DuDiyn Terminals, 913 E2d at 72; Watkms, 954 E2d at 980 n.7; Loggerhead
Turtle v. County Council of Volusia County, 148 E3d 1231, 1251 n.23 (11th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 526 U.S. 1081 (1999) (concluding that "no authority even remotely suggests that
proximate causation applies to the doctrine of standing").
31. Defi:nders of Wild/iii:, 504 U.S. at 561 (citation omitted).
32. Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 7 (2002) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,
751(1984)).
33. Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 883 (1990).
34. Hunt v. Wash. StateAppleAdver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333,343 (1977).
35. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669,
689 (1973).
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dismiss, a plaintiff's "general factual allegations of injury resulting from
the defendant's conduct may suffice [to establish the plaintiff's standing
to sue], for on a motion to dismiss [the Supreme Court] ... 'presume[s]
that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to
support the claim."'36
Consequently, if a defendant in a federal court believes that the
plaintiff's allegations in his or her complaint in support of standing to sue
are untrue, the defendant should move for summary judgment under
Rule 56 on the standing issue and demonstrate to the federal court that
the plaintiff's allegations with respect to standing "were sham and raised
no genuine issue of fact." 37 "In response to a summary judgment motion,
... the plaintiff can no longer rest on such 'mere allegations,' but must
'set forth' by affidavit or other evidence 'specific facts,' Fed. Rule Civ.
Proc. 56(e), which for purposes of the summary judgment motion will be
taken to be true." 38 If the defendant at trial controverts the facts set forth
by the plaintiff in response to the defendant's motion for summary
judgment, these facts "must be 'supported adequately by the evidence
adduced at trial."' 39
III.

STANDING TO SUE BASED UPON AESTHETIC, RECREATIONAL OR
CONSERVATIONAL INJURY

Although the Supreme Court has long recognized that an injury to a
legally protected economic or property interest is a sufficient basis for
standing to sue in federal court,40 only in the last thirty or so years has the
Court recognized that harm to a person's aesthetic, recreational or
conservational interest can satisfy the "injury in fact" standing
requirement. 41 However, in order for a person to satisfy the injury in fact
standing requirement on the basis of harm to that person's recreational or
aesthetic interests, the person must allege and establish that he or she
physically uses the area affected by the defendant's challenged activity
36.

Defi:nders of Wildlifi:, 504 U.S. at 561 (quoting Nat'/ Wildlifi: Fed'n, 497 U.S. at

889).
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. at 689.
37.
38. Defi:nders of Wildlifi:, 504 U.S. at 561. Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file may be
considered by the court, along with the pleadings and affidavits, in determining whether there is a
genuine issue as to any material fact with respect to the plaintiff's standing to sue and whether the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Nat'/ Wildlifi: Fed'n, 497 U.S. at 884.
39. Defi:nders of Wildlifi:, 504 U.S. at 561 (quoting Gladstone, Realtors v. Viii. of
Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 115 n.31 (1979)).
40.
See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 733 (1972).
41.
Id at 733-34; Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. at 68687.
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and is a "person 'for whom the aesthetic and recreational values of the
area will be lessened' by the challenged activity.'"' 2 By definition, this
"physical use/presence" requirement for aesthetic or recreational injury is
not satisfied by a person who derives aesthetic enjoyment only from
viewing an affected natural area by means of a video, film, still
photograph, or from reading about the area in a newspaper, book,
magazine, or other print media.
The Supreme Court's "use"-of-the-"affected area" test requires both
( 1) that a person seeking standing to sue on the basis of aesthetic or
recreational injury must physically use or visit either the exact area where
the defendant's challenged activity occurs or an area that is "adjacent" to
("next door'"' 3 to) that area, and (2) that the defendant's aesthetic or
recreational enjoyment of the area is "lessened" by the defendant's
challenged activity. 44 When a plaintiff uses or visits such an "adjacent" or
"next door" area, a plaintiff's aesthetic or recreational enjoyment from
physical presence in an area would be "lessened" because of the
plaintiff's sensory perceptions (usually through sight, sound, or smell) of
adverse effects on nearby or adjacent land that are caused by the
defendant's challenged activity. 45 However, a plaintiff's mere allegation
that he or she uses an "area in the vicinity of" the area where the
defendant's challenged activity occurs is not ·specific enough to satisfy
this physical use/presence requirement for aesthetic or recreational injury
in fact. 46 Consequently, a plaintiff cannot avoid a court granting a
defendant's motion for summary judgment under Rule 56(e) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "by averments which state only that
one of [plaintiff's] ... members uses unspecified portions of an immense
tract of territory, on some portions of which mining activity has occurred
or probably will occur by virtue of the [defendant's challenged] ...
action.'"' 7
Although adverse effects on outdoor activities such as camping,
hiking, fishing, swimming, boating, picnicking, bird watching, and
sightseeing implicitly have been recognized by the Supreme Court as
42.
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 183
(2000) (quoting Morton, 405 U.S. at 735).
DefendersofWildlife, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7 (dictum).
43.
44.
Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 183; see Morton, 405 U.S. at 735.
45.
A person engaging in recreational activities near (but not in) a polluted river has been
held to suffer injury to his aesthetic and recreational interests when he was offended by the color
and bad odors of the nearby polluted river that he personally perceived through his own senses of
sight and smell. Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Powell Duffiyn Terminals, Inc. 913
E2d 64,71 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. dem~ 498 U.S 1109 (1991).
46.
See Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 886, 889 ( 1990).
Jd at 889.
47.
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injuries in fact to aesthetic and recreational interests for purposes of
48
satisfying federal standing to sue requirements, the Supreme Court has
never established a general test for determining what types of adverse
effects to an individual's outdoor activities will be considered to be injury
in fact to an individual's aesthetic and recreational interests for purposes
of federal standing to sue requirements.
In order to qualify as an aesthetic or recreational injury in fact for
standing to sue purposes, a person's outdoor activity that is adversely
affected probably would have to be a lawful activity. Adverse effects on
an individual's outdoor activity should not be considered a recreational or
aesthetic injury in fact if that activity is illegal under federal, state, or
local law, because traditionally an injury in fact is recognized only when
a person's legally protected or legally recognized interests are adversely
affected. 49 Consequently, if a person's fishing or hunting that is adversely
affected is illegal activity (such as poaching, fishing or hunting out of the
lawful season, or exceeding legal catch limits), such adverse effects on
illegal fishing or hunting presumably would not be recognized as
recreational or aesthetic injury in fact that confers standing to sue.
Similarly, adverse effects on other illegal outdoor activities, such as
distilling moonshine whiskey, probably would not be recognized as
recreational or aesthetic injury in fact for purposes of federal standing to
sue requirements.
Although fishing (an activity that may kill or injure certain fish)
implicitly has been recognized as an outdoor activity that is within an
individual's aesthetic and recreational interests for standing to sue
purposes, 50 the Supreme Court has not explicitly addressed the issue of
whether adverse effects on a person's hunting of wildlife can constitute
recreational or aesthetic injury. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has not
explicitly addressed the issue of whether adverse effects on a person's
outdoor activity can be considered to be an injury to that person's
aesthetic and recreational interests for standing to sue purposes, when
that outdoor activity causes harm to wildlife, ecosystems or other parts of
the natural physical environment. A situation raising this issue would be
presented if a defendant's challenged activity caused adverse effects to a
plaintiff's recreational use of an off-road vehicle or a snowmobile.
48. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669,
685 (1973); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181-83
(2000).
49. Morton, 405 U.S. at 733 (referring to "the various formulations of 'legal interest' and
'legal wrong' then prevailing as constitutional requirements of standing").
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. at 685; Laidlaw, 528
50.
U.S. at 181-83.
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Should such adverse effects be considered to be an injury in fact to the
plaintiff's aesthetic or recreational interests for standing to sue purposes,
when the plaintiff's adversely-affected outdoor activities cause harm to
the environment? Even if adverse effects to such environmentallyharmful outdoor activities are considered recreational or aesthetic injury
in fact, an individual alleging such injuries, nevertheless, might be denied
standing to sue in federal court on the ground that such injury is not
within the zone of interests allegedly protected by a federal
environmental protection statute. 5 1
The Supreme Court has identified neither the ways in which a
person can derive aesthetic enjoyment from an area used or visited by
that person, nor defined what types of adverse effects upon an individual
can constitute an injury in fact to that person's aesthetic interests for
federal standing to sue purposes. The Supreme Court did state in Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife that "[o]f course, the desire to use or observe an
animal species, even for purely aesthetic purposes, is undeniably a
cognizable interest for purpose of standing."52 Furthermore, the court
recognized in Laidlaw that adverse effects on an individual's outdoor
bird-watching activities can constitute aesthetic injury in fact for standing
to sue purposes. 53 Earlier, in Sierra Club v. Morton, the Supreme Court
stated that it did "not question" that "injury in fact" sufficient for
standing to sue occurs when construction of a road in a national park
destroys or otherwise adversely affects the scenery, natural and historic
objects, and wildlife of the park, lessening aesthetic values for users of
the area. 54
Morton and Laidlaw therefore indicate that aesthetic injury in fact
may occur when an individual's aesthetic enjoyment of wildlife, an
ecosystem or a historic structure or object, that results from the person's
use of her sensory perceptions (including hearing, smell, and touch, as
well as sight), is adversely affected by a defendant's alteration or
development of the natural physical environment (or of any historic
structure or object). The Court, however, also should recognize that a
person can gain aesthetic enjoyment from knowledge of the
environmental characteristics of an area used or visited by that person, as

51. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text (discussing the prudential zone of
interests requirement).
52. 504 u.s. 555,562-63 (1992).
53. 528 U.S. at 182-83.
54. 405 U.S. at 734.
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well as from the person's sensory perceptions of the area while using or
being physically present in that area. 55
The Supreme Court has never required a plaintiff alleging an
aesthetic injury in fact to establish the truthfulness of the claim by any
type of objective or quantitative evidence and has given no indication
whether, or how, a defendant successfully can defend a claim by a
plaintiff that the defendant's challenged conduct will cause, or has
caused, adverse effects to the plaintiff's aesthetic enjoyment of the area
affected by the defendant's conduct. However, the determination of
whether a plaintiff has suffered an aesthetic injury in fact in most cases
probably will be based upon the plaintiff's subjective allegations and
statements, because "aesthetic perceptions are necessarily personal and
subjective"-unless a plaintiff's claim that the defendant's challenged
activity lessens the plaintiff's aesthetic enjoyment of a particular
"affected area" is found to be too preposterous to be believed to be true. 56
Although the Supreme Court in Morton stated in dictum that the
injury in fact element of federal standing to sue requirements can be
satisfied when there is an injury to a conservational value or interest of
the plaintiff/ 7 the Supreme Court has never defined the term
"conservational value," and has never stated whether a person alleging a
conservational injury in fact must satisfy the physical user test that is
required for a recreational or aesthetic injury in faces
IV

STANDING TO SUE IN POLLUTION CASES UNDER FRIENDS OF THE
EARTH, INC. V. LAIDLAWENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES {TOC), INC.

The Supreme Court in Laidlaw addressed in depth for the first time
the issue of the requirements that an individual alleging aesthetic and
recreational injury in fact must satisfy in order to meet federal standing
to sue requirements in a suit seeking injunctive relief and assessment of
55.
See Vt. Pub. Interest Research Group v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 247 E Supp. 2d
495, 510-11 (D. Vt. 2002) (holding that a plaintiff, who visited a particular affected area where he
studied and engaged in recreational activities, had standing to sue in a suit seeking to protect a
rare species that inhabited streams in the affected area, even if the plaintiff had not personally
observed any members of these rare species, because of the value the plaintiff placed on knowing
that these species existed in these streams). The court seemed to consider this value, that the
plaintiff derived from knowing these species existed in the affected area used by the plaintiff for
recreational activities, to be part of the plaintiff's aesthetic enjoyment of the affected area, by
stating "There can be no doubt that such concrete interests include the kind of aesthetic and
recreational uses ... that the affiants claim to enjoy." Id at 509.
56.
Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 230 E3d 1141, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000).
57.
Morton, 405 U.S. at 738.
58.
This Article therefore will not analyze "conservational" injury in fact as a basis for
satisfYing federal standing to sue requirements.
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civil penalties against a facility discharging pollutants into a river or other
surface body of water. 59 In Laidlaw, the Supreme Court held that
residents who lived near the river and the defendant's facility had
standing to sue the owner of the facility for civil penalties and injunctive
relief because they alleged both (1) that they were refraining from using
either the river or areas bordering the river because of the defendant's
"continuous and pervasive illegal discharges of pollutants into [the
river]" (due to their reasonable fears of defendant's discharges of
pollutants) and (2) "that they would use the nearby ... [r]iver for
recreation if [the defendant] ... were not discharging pollutants into it."60
The Laidlaw case involved a waste water treatment plant in
Roebuck, South Carolina (that was part of a hazardous waste incinerator
facility) that was owned by Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc.
(Laidlaw) and discharges from that facility of pollutants, particularly the
"extremely toxic pollutant" mercury, into the North Tyger River in South
Carolina. 61 The Laidlaw plant received an NPDES permit from the South
Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) that
placed limits on Laidlaw's discharges of several pollutants (including
mercury) into the North Tyger River. 62 The plant "repeatedly" discharged
pollutants into the river that exceeded the limits set by Laidlaw's NPDES
permit, with Laidlaw "consistently fail[ing] to meet the permit's stringent
... daily average limit on mercury discharges."63
After Friends of the Earth, Inc. and a local environmental
organization notified Laidlaw that they would file a citizen suit against
Laidlaw under section 505(a) of the Clean Water Act after expiration of
59. 528 U.S. 167, 181-88 (2000). In Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study
Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 74 (1978), an earlier decision involving air and water pollution, the
Supreme Court held that individuals seeking to halt the construction of two new nuclear power
plants that were being built near their homes established satisfactory environmental, aesthetic,
and health injury in fact for purposes of federal standing to sue requirements, but did so in
cursory fashion without identifying and applying the relevant legal principles, as the Court did in
Laidlaw. In Duke Power Co., the Court Erst held that satisfactory injury in fact was established
on the basis of the environmental and aesthetic consequences of thermal pollution that the power
plants would discharge into lakes used by the plaintiffs for recreational purposes, with the Court
merely citing United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S.
669, 689 (1973), and Morton, 405 U.S. at 734, in support of this holding. Duke Power Co., 438
U.S. at 73-74. Duke Power Co. also held that "the emission of non-natural radiation into the
[plaintiffs'] ... environment would also seem a direct and present injury, given our generalized
concern about exposure to radiation and the apprehension flowing from the uncertainty about the
health and genetic consequences of even small emissions like those concededly emitted by
nuclear power plants." /d at 74.
60. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 184.
61. /d at 176.
62. /d
63. /d
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the CWA's requisite sixty-day notice period,64 Laidlaw arranged to have
the DHEC file an enforcement suit against Laidlaw (using a complaint
drafted and filed by Laidlaw, with Laidlaw also paying the filing fee 6) , in
an attempt to have the proposed CWA citizen suit barred through the
provisions of section 505(b)(1)(B) ofthe CWA. 66 On the last day before
the sixty-day notice period expired, the DHEC and Laidlaw agreed to a
settlement of the DHEC's enforcement suit, whereby Laidlaw agreed to
pay $100,000 in civil penalties and "to make 'every effort' to comply
with its permit obligations."67
Despite this settlement agreement, Friends of the Earth, Sierra
Club, and a local environmental organization (hereinafter referred to
collectively as FOE) filed a CWA citizen suit against Laidlaw on June
12, 1992, three days after the settlement agreement was reached. 68 FOE,
in its complaint, alleged that Laidlaw was not in compliance with its
CWA NPDES permit and requested declaratory and injunctive relief and
assessment of civil penalties against Laidlaw. 69
After Laidlaw filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground
that FOE lacked standing to sue, FOE submitted to the district court
affidavits and deposition testimony of members of the plaintiff
organizations. 70 These members, who gave sworn statements, asserted
that their recreational, aesthetic, and economic interests were adversely
affected by Laidlaw's discharges of pollutants into the North Tyger
River. 7' The district court denied Laidlaw's motion for summary
judgment after examining FOE's submissions and other affidavits of
members of the plaintiff organizations that were previously submitted by
the plaintiffs in support of an earlier motion for preliminary injunctive
relief. 72 The district court also denied Laidlaw's motion to dismiss the
citizen suit under section 505(b)(1)(B) of the CWA, because the district
64. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(l)(A) (2000) (stating that section 505(b)(l)(A) of the CWA
requires that prior notice of the proposed filing of a CWA citizen suit be given by the prospective
plaintiff to the alleged violator of the CWA (who is the prospective defendant in the suit), the
United States Environmental Protection Agency [hereinafter EPA] and the state water pollution
control agency of the state where the defendant's alleged violations are occurring).
65. LaJdlaw, 528 U.S. at 176-77, 178n.l.
66.
/datl76-77.
67. Id at 177 (citation omitted).
68. Id
69. /d
70.
/d
71.
/d at 181-84.
72. Id at 177; see infia notes 88-95 and accompanying text (describing the sworn
statements of six of these members upon which Justice Ginsburg subsequently relied to hold that
the plaintiff organizations had standing, on behalf of these members, to sue for injunctive relief
and civil penalties).
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court held that the DHEC's enforcement action against Laidlaw had not
73
been "diligently prosecuted."
In January 1997, more than four years after FOE filed its citizen
suit against Laidlaw, the district court issued its final judgment in the
case, in which it assessed Laidlaw $405,800 in civil penalties (to be paid
to the United States Treasury). 74 However, the district court declined to
issue the injunctive relief requested by FOE, on the ground "that an
injunction was inappropriate because 'Laidlaw has been in substantial
compliance with all parameters in its NPDES permit since at least
August 1992,"' with the last recorded discharge of mercury in violation
of Laidlaw's NPDES permit having occurred in January 1995. 75
FOE appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit on the ground that the amount of civil penalties assessed by the
district court was inadequate, but did not appeal the district court's denial
of the requested declaratory and injunctive relief. 76 Laidlaw crossappealed, on grounds that included FOE's lack of standing to sue and that
the citizen suit was barred because the DHEC's enforcement actions and
settlement agreement with Laidlaw were "diligent prosecution" within
the meaning of section 505(b)( 1)(B) of the CWA. 77
The Court of Appeals issued a judgment vacating the district court's
order and remanding with instructions to dismiss the action on the
ground that the case was moot. 78 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the
case was moot since "the only remedy currently available ...--civil
penalties payable to the government-would not redress any injury
[suffered by FOE]."79 The Court of Appeals assumed that FOE had
standing to sue to bring the citizen suit, without deciding that issue. 80
After this decision by the Court of Appeals, Laidlaw closed its entire
incinerator facility in Roebuck, South Carolina, and all discharges from
the facility into the North Tyger River "permanently ceased."81
The Supreme Court thereafter granted certiorari in the case, "to
resolve the inconsistency between the Fourth Circuit's decision in this
case and the decisions of several other Courts of Appeals, which have
73.
Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 177.
74.
Id at 178.
75.
Id (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 956 F.
Supp. 588,611 (D.S.C. 1997)).
76. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 179.
77. Id
78. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 149 F.3d 303, 306-07
(4th Cir. 1998).
79.
Id
80.
See id at 306 n.3.
81.
Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 179.
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held that a defendant's compliance with its permit after the
commencement of litigation does not moot claims for civil penalties
under the Act."82
The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in holding
that the case was moot,83 but on its own initiative also addressed the issue
of whether FOE met federal standing to sue requirements in the case.84
Justice Ginsburg, in her opinion for the Court, held "that FOE had
standing under Article III to bring this action."85
Justice Ginsburg held that the sworn affidavits and depositions of
six members of the plaintiff organizations (Kenneth Lee Curtis, Angela
Patterson, Judy Pruitt, Linda Moore, Gail Lee, and Norman Sharp)
"adequately documented injury in fact" to "those affiants' recreational,
aesthetic and economic interests."86 Stating that "[t]he relevant showing
for purposes of Article III standing ... is not injury to the environment
but injury to the plaintiff," Justice Ginsburg rejected Laidlaw's argument
that these members did not show that they "had sustained or faced the
threat of any 'injury in fact' from Laidlaw's activities" because they
failed to prove that Laidlaw's discharges of mercury, in violation of
discharge limitations in its NPDES permit, resulted in any harm to the
environment or any health risk. 87
According to Justice Ginsburg, Curtis stated in his affidavits and
depositions that he lived a half-mile from Laidlaw's facility, and that as a
teenager he had fished, camped, swam, and picnicked in and near the
river between three and fifteen miles downstream from the Laidlaw
facility and would like to do so again. 88 Curtis, however, stated that he
did not do so now because of his concern that the river's water (which he
said looked and smelled polluted) was polluted by Laidlaw's discharges. 89
Patterson stated that she lived two miles from the Laidlaw facility, and
that before Laidlaw operated the facility, she had picnicked, walked, birdwatched, and waded in and along the river because of its natural beauty. 90
Patterson stated, however, "that she no longer engaged in these activities
in or near the river because she was concerned about harmful effects
82.
Id at 179-80.
Id at 180.
83.
84.
Id The Court raised the standing to sue issue on its own initiative because lack of
standing to sue would deprive the Court of Article III jurisdiction. Id
85.
Id at 189.
Id at 183-84.
86.
Id at 181; see in!Ta 146-148 and accompanying text.
87.
Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 181-82.
88.
Id
89.
90.
Id at 182.
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from discharged pollutants," and that she and her husband, despite a
desire to do so, did not intend to purchase a home near the river, "in part
because of Laidlaw's discharges." 91 Pruitt, who lived one-quarter mile
from the Laidlaw facility, was described as desiring to fish, hike, and
picnic along the river but as not doing so because of Laidlaw's
discharges. 92 Moore, who lived twenty miles from Roebuck (where
Laidlaw's facility was located), attested that she would use the river south
of Roebuck, and lands bordering it, for hiking, picnicking, camping,
swimming, boating, and diving were she not concerned about Laidlaw's
illegal discharges and pollutants in the water. 93 Lee attested that her
home, located "near" the Laidlaw facility (with the exact distance not
specified by Justice Ginsburg), had a lower value than similar homes
located farther away from the facility and that she believed that some of
this lower value was due to Laidlaw's pollutant discharges. 94 Sharp stated
that he canoed on the river about forty miles downstream from the
Laidlaw facility and would like to canoe in the river closer to the Laidlaw
facility, but did not do so because of his concern "that the water
contained harmful pollutants."95
As described by Justice Ginsburg, these affiants did not assert that
they suffered a past injury in fact resulting from the defendant's alleged
unlawful pollutant discharges into the river that lessened their
recreational and aesthetic enjoyment during their past use of the river and
surrounding areas. 96 Nor did the affiants appear to assert that they would
in the future suffer imminent injury in fact as a result of the defendant's
allegedly unlawful pollutant discharges into the river lessening their
recreational and aesthetic enjoyment during their future use of the river
and surrounding areas. 97
Instead, these affiants' sworn statements asserted that the affiants
suffered or would suffer injury in fact both (1) because they refrained
from recreational use of the river and surrounding areas because of fears
and concerns about the effects of the defendant's discharges of pollutants
into the river and (2) because they would use the river and surrounding
areas for recreational activities if the defendant's discharges of pollutants
into the river ceased. 98 This first asserted injury in fact (from the affiants'
91.

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id
Jd
/d
/d at 182-83.
/d at 183.
Seeidat181-83.

Seeid
Seeid
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refraining from recreational use of the river and surrounding areas) might
be interpreted as not only asserting an injury that occurred in the past
(prior to the filing of the lawsuit), but as also asserting both (1) a present
injury in fact that was continuing at the present time (after the lawsuit
was filed through the Supreme Court's issuance of its judgment in the
case) and (2) an imminent future injury that would continue into the
immediate future (after the Supreme Court's judgment was issued) until
the defendant's pollutant discharges (or allegedly unlawful pollutant
discharges) ceased. The affiants' second asserted injury (future use of
the river that is conditioned upon the defendant's pollutant discharges
ending) might be interpreted as complementing the affiants' first asserted
injury in fact, together asserting that in the imminent near future the
affiants would refrain from recreational use of the river and surrounding
areas because of fears and concerns about the effects of the defendant's
pollutant discharges into the river, but that the affiants would begin
recreational uses of the river and surrounding areas if the defendant's
pollutant discharges (or allegedly unlawful pollutant discharges) ceased. 99
Justice Ginsburg held that these members' "sworn statements ...
adequately documented injury in. fact," 100 on the basis of the principle
"that environmental plaintiffs adequately allege injury in fact when they
aver that they use the affected area and are persons 'for whom the
aesthetic and recreational values of the area will be lessened' by the
challenged activity." 101
Justice Ginsburg based this principle upon the Supreme Court's
1972 decision in Sierra Club v. Morton, which she quoted in her
statement of the principle. 102 In Morton, which established the "physical
user" test for aesthetic and recreational injury in fact for standing to sue
purposes, 103 the Supreme Court did not "question" that the type of harm
that would result from proposed changes to Mineral King Valley as a
result of construction of a huge resort complex "may amount to an
'injury in fact' sufficient to lay the basis for standing under § 10 of the
APA." 104 After noting that the resort complex would result in "change in
99. This latter conditional assertion of future use of the river appears to be conditioned
upon the defendant ending all of its discharges of pollutants into the river, not just ending the
allegedly unlawful discharges that were in violation of the discharge limitations in the defendant's
CWA NPDES permit. See id at 184 (noting "affiants' conditional statements that they would use
the nearby North Tyger River for recreation ifLaid1aw were not discharging pollutants into it").
100. Jd at 183.
101. Jd (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972)).
102. Jd
103. See supra notes 42-4 7 and accompanying text (discussing the physical user test).
104. Morton, 405 U.S. at 734.
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the uses, to which Mineral King will be put, and the attendant change in
the aesthetics and ecology of the area," 105 the Court in Morton then noted
that the plaintiff's complaint alleged that a road that would be
constructed through Sequoia National Park for the resort complex
'"would destroy or otherwise adversely affect the scenery, natural and
historic objects and wildlife of the park and would impair the enjoyment
of the park for future generations."' 106 The Court in Morton also stated
that "the alleged injury will be felt directly only by those who use
Mineral King and Sequoia National Park, and for whom the aesthetic and
recreational values of the area will be lessened by the highway and ski
resort." 107
Morton probably used "adversely affected" area terminology
because the plaintiff in that action brought suit under section 10 of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which provides that "[a] person
suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is
entitled to judicial review thereof." 108 Although the APA only governs
suits in federal courts against federal administrative agencies that are
subject to the requirements of the APA, the CWA's citizen suit provision,
which was the basis for the plaintiffs' suit in Laidlaw, authorizes certain
suits to be brought under its provisions against a private business
corporation or individual by "a person or persons having an interest
which is or may be adversely affected." 109 This language in the CWA
citizen suit provision was previously interpreted by the Supreme Court as
conferring standing to sue on a "broad category of potential plaintiffs"
who "can claim some sort of injury," whether economic or noneconomic!10 Justice Ginsburg in Laidlaw, therefore, needed no explicit
justification for extending Morton's "adversely affected area" test, for
determining aesthetic and recreational injury in fact, to a suit against a
privately owned facility in a citizen suit under the CWA.
The Clean Air Act's citizen suit provision, however, authorizes
certain citizen suits by "any person," without any requirement that a

105. Id
106. Id
107. /dat735.
I 08. 5 U.S. C. § 702 (2000).
109. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1365(a), (g) (2000). The CWA defmes "person" to mean "an individual,
corporation, partnership, association, State, municipality, commission, or other political
subdivision of a State, or any interstate body." Id § 1362(5).
110. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'! Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. I, 16-17
(1981).
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"person" have an interest that is or may be "adversely affected." 111 The
CAA citizen suit provision thus appears to permit a suit under its
provisions by any person who meets federal constitutional standing to
sue requirements. Justice Ginsburg's stated principle in Laidlaw for
recreational or aesthetic injury in fact refers to "environmental
plaintiffs" 112 generally, not just to plaintiffs in CWA citizen suits, and is
stated as a principle governing the injury in fact element of federal
constitutional standing requirements (not standing requirements only for
Clean Water Act citizen suits). A plaintiff in a CAA citizen suit,
therefore, should be able to establish recreational and aesthetic injury in
fact under Laidlaw's principles.
Consequently, Laidlaw's test for recreational and aesthetic injury in
fact also should apply to citizen suits brought under the Clean Air Ad 13
and other federal statutes that authorize certain suits either by an
"adversely affected person" or by any "person." 114
Justice Ginsburg's test in Laidlaw for recreational and aesthetic
injury in fact only requires a plaintiff to allege and establish that the
defendant's challenged activity "lessens" or will "lessen" the plaintiff's
recreational or aesthetic enjoyment of the "affected area."
Under Laidlaw, then, an individual can establish "injury in fact" by
showing a connection to the area of concern sufficient to make credible the
contention that the person's future life will be less enjoyable--that he or
she really has [suffered] or will suffer in his or her degree of aesthetic or
recreational satisfaction--if the area in question remains or becomes
environmentally degraded. Factors of residential contiguity [to the
affected area] and frequency of use [of the affected area] may certainly be

111. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (2000). The Clean Air Act defmes "person" to include "an
individual, corporation, partnership, association, State, municipality, political subdivision of a
State, and any agency, department, or instrumentality of the United States and any officer, agent,
or employee thereof" Id § 7602(e).
112. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 183
(2000).
113. Several federal district courts have applied Laidlaw in CAA citizen suits in
determining the injury-in-fact element of federal standing to sue requirements. Bayview Hunters
Point Cmty. Advocates v. Metro. Transp. Comm'n, 177 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1019 (N.D. Cal. 2001);
Cmtys. for Better Env't v. Cenco Ref, 180 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1075 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
114. Laidlaw's test for recreational and aesthetic injury has been applied in a suit brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (the Clean Air Act's general judicial review provision), New lV!K
Public Interest Research Group v. Whitman, 321 F.2d 316 (2d Cir. 2003); and in a suit brought
under 15 U.S.C. § 2618(a)(l) (2000) (the general judicial review provision of the Toxic
Substances Control Act), Central & South l*st Services, Inc. v. United States EPA, 220 F.3d 683,
700-01 (5th Cir. 2000), reh 'g denied, 237 F.3d 633 (5th Cir.), cei1. denied, Utility Solid Waste
Activities Group v. EPA, 532 U.S. 1065 (2001).
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relevant to that determination, but are not to be evaluated in a one-size-fitsall, mechanistic manner. 115
Although Justice Ginsburg's decision in Laidlaw holds that the
injury in fact element can be satisfied by a plaintiff using an area
"affected" by the defendant's challenged activity and whose recreational
or aesthetic enjoyment of the area is "lessened" by the defendant's
"challenged activity," her opinion neither defines "affected area" and
defendant's "challenged activity" for purposes of federal standing to sue
requirements, nor specifies factors that are relevant to determining
whether a specific geographical area is part of an area "affected" by the
defendant's challenged activity. 116
Although Justice Ginsburg neither defined the term "challenged
activity" nor identified the actions of defendant Laidlaw that she
considered to be the defendant's "challenged activity," she appears to
consider defendant Laidlaw's "challenged activity" to be only the portion
of Laidlaw's pollutant discharges into the North Tyger River allegedly
violating Laidlaw's CWA NPDES permit-not the entire amount of
Laidlaw's pollutant discharges into the river. This conclusion is based
upon the references, in the injury-in-fact portion of Justice Ginsburg's
opinion, to "Laidlaw's unlawful conduct-discharging pollutants in
excess of permit limits" and Laidlaw's "illegal discharges," as well as the
fact that the amounts of pollutants discharged by Laidlaw into the river
that did not exceed the effiuent limitations in its CWA NPDES permit
would not be illegal discharges that could be enjoined in a CWA citizen
suit. 117
Consequently, "challenged activity" for purposes of La1dlaws
injury-in-fact test should be defined as only the parts of a defendant's
activities that allegedly violate the United States Constitution or a federal
statute or regulation, and should not include parts of the defendant's
activities that are not alleged to be illegal or unlawful. Under this
approach, in a CWA or CAA citizen suit alleging that a defendant has
violated monitoring, reporting, or record-keeping requirements, the
defendant's "challenged activity" probably should be found to be the
defendant's failure to do the required monitoring of pollutants, reporting
or record-keeping.
In determining whether the amount of pollutants discharged by a
polluter into a river in violation of discharge limitations in its NPDES

115. Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 230 F.3d 1141,1149 (9th Cir. 2000).
116. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 183.
117. /d at 184.
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permit "affected" areas used by the plaintiffs' members and lessened
their recreational and aesthetic enjoyment of the affected areas they used,
a court should consider the cumulative impacts of both the defendant's
illegal discharges and legal discharges and the discharges of the same
types of pollutants into the river by other persons, because "even a slight
increase in adverse conditions that form an existing environmental milieu
may sometimes threaten harm that is significant. One more factory
polluting air and water in an area zoned for industrial use may represent
the straw that breaks the back of the environmental camel." 118
Consequently, a court, in determining · whether allegedly unlawful
discharges of pollutants by a defendant "affect" a particular area and
"lessen" the plaintiff's recreational and aesthetic enjoyment of that area,
should determine the extent of the impacts of those allegedly unlawful
discharges when added to the adverse effects caused by both the lawful
portions of the defendant's pollutant discharges and the pollutant
discharges by other persons. A court, when applying La1dlaws injury in
fact test, should not seek to determine, hypothetically, what adverse
impacts the unlawful portion of a defendant's pollutant discharges would
cause to the area in question, and to the plaintiff's recreational and
aesthetic enjoyment of that area, in a hypothetical situation where the
defendant's unlawful discharges were the only pollutant discharges
affecting the area in question.
Although Justice Ginsburg's opinion in Laidlaw does not define
"affected area" for purposes of"injury in fact," her opinion should not be
interpreted as establishing a per se standard defining "affected area"
exactly the same way in all CWA citizen suits, requiring in every CWA
citizen suit that the specific place used by the plaintiff be within a
specified distance to the place where the defendant discharged pollutants.
In Laidlaw, member Norman Sharp's recreational use of the river for
canoeing forty miles downstream from the Laidlaw facility was the
activity farthest away from the Laidlaw facility among the six members
whose affected interests were described by Justice Ginsburg. 119 However,
Justice Ginsburg made no statements indicating that another member's
recreational use of a river more than forty miles downstream from the
defendant's facility could not have been considered to be a use of the
"affected area." Justice Ginsburg made no statements indicating that in
other CWA citizen suits, involving different facts, the "affected area"

118. Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 831 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908
(1973) (involving the National Environmental Policy Act§ 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)).
119. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 183.
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would always extend forty miles downstream from the defendant's
facility that discharges pollutants into a river or stream.
From a scientific standpoint, a per se "mileage" test should not be
adopted for the interpretation of "affected area," because in most
situations the determination of whether a specific place is an area
"affected" by a defendant's discharges or emissions of a particular type of
pollutant into a body of water or outdoor ambient air (and an area where
the plaintiff's aesthetic or recreational enjoyment of the area is lessened
by the defendant's pollutant discharges or emissions) will depend upon
the concentration of the type of pollutant (expressed in terms of the
weight of that pollutant in a particular volume of water or air) that is
measured at the specific place, and the harm or threatened harm resulting
from that concentration of pollutants in that specific place.
However, federal courts should not adopt a test for recreational and
aesthetic injury in fact that requires a citizen plaintiff in a CWA or CAA
citizen suit to measure scientifically the concentration of pollutants in a
specific place in a body of water or outdoor ambient air used by the
plaintiff and to have that scientific data assessed by an expert scientist to
determine whether the measured pollutant concentration harms or
threatens harm to the environment or public health. 120 Such a test
would further thwart congressional intent by recreating the old system of
water quality standards whose failure led to the enactment of the Clean
Water Act in the first place.... An important reason for Congress' shift to
end-of-pipe standards was to eliminate the need to address complex
questions of environmental abasement and scientific traceability in
enforcement proceedings. To have standing now turn on direct evidence of
such things as the chemical composition and salinity of receiving waters
would throw federal legislative efforts to control water pollution into a time
warp by judicially reinstating the previous statutory regime in the form of
escalated standing requirements. Courts would become enmeshed in
abstruse scientific discussions as standing questions assumed a
121
complicated life of their own.

A requirement that the "affected area" be established by scientific
measurements in most cases also would be such an expensive and

120. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 162
(4th Cir. 2000) (en bane) (holding that Article III of the United States Constitution does not
require "laboratory analysis of the chemical content, salinity or ecosystem" of the area used by
the plaintiff for recreational activities in order to satisfy federal standing to sue requirements, and
that Congress does not require such scientific evidence in order for a plaintiff to achieve standing
to sue in a CWA citizen suit).
121. Id at 163.
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burdensome requirement that many meritorious citizen suits would be
deterred from being brought under the CWA and CAA.
Of course, a plaintiff in a CWA or CAA citizen suit should be
permitted to introduce scientific measurements of the concentrations of
pollutants in the outdoor ambient air or a body of water at a specific
location, and expert scientific witnesses testifying as to the likely source
of those pollutants and the harm or effects to the environment caused by
such pollutant concentrations, to establish that a specific area, used by
the plaintiff for recreational or aesthetic enjoyment, is "affected" by the
pollutants discharged or emitted by a particular defendant. But a plaintiff
in a CWA or CAA citizen suit should not be required to introduce such
scientific evidence in order to establish recreational or aesthetic injury in
fact under Laidlaw.
To avoid unnecessarily placing expensive scientific monitoring
requirements upon plaintiffs in CWA and CAA citizen suits, the
determination of whether a specific place is an area "affected" by the
defendant's discharges or emissions of pollutants should be permitted to
be based upon two factors: (1) the distance between the specific place
used by the plaintiff and the place where the defendant discharged or
emitted pollutants (with this distance of separation being used as an
approximate measure of the concentration of the discharged or emitted
pollutants at the place used by the plaintiff) and (2) the type of statutory
or regulatory violation allegedly committed by the defendant whose
pollutant discharges or emissions are being challenged (with the type of
violation being used as an approximate measure of the adverse effects
that a defendant's discharge may have upon "nearby" areas). 122
Justice Ginsburg's analysis of the injury in fact element in her
majority opinion in Laidlawmay be interpreted as implicitly permitting
this approach. Her opinion refers not only to the defendant's "illegal
discharges" 123 allegedly not in compliance with effluent limitations in the
defendant's NPDES permit/ 24 but also refers to the affiant members who
established injury in fact as residing "nearby" the North Tyger River. 125
The opinion explicitly identifies for each of these affiant members
(except for member Gail Lee) either the distance between a member's
residence and Laidlaw's facility, or the distance between the place used

122. See infi"anotes 145-161 and accompanying text (discussing latter factor).
123. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 184.
124. Id at 181.
125. Id at 184.
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(or desired to be used) by a member for recreational activity and
Laidlaw's facility (or both). 126
Although Justice Ginsburg's opinion in Laidlawdoes not explicitly
explain why the type of alleged violation of the CWA or CAA should be
a relevant factor in determining whether a specific place is part of the
area "affected" by the defendant's challenged activity, the injury in fact
part of her opinion may be interpreted as implicitly holding that, as a
matter of law, injury in fact should be found to occur to recreational users
of areas "nearby" a facility allegedly discharging pollutants in violation
of discharge limitations in an NPDES permit. This interpretation rests on
the grounds that as a matter oflaw the defendant's unlawful discharges in
excess of its permit's effluent limitations "affect" nearby areas by
lessening the recreational and aesthetic enjoyment of users of that
affected area. Furthermore, this interpretation is based upon Justice
Ginsburg's statement that the "standing hurdle" should not be raised
"higher than the necessary showing for success on the merits in an action
alleging noncompliance with [effluent limitations of] an NPDES
permit." 127 This statement should be interpreted as indicating that Justice
Ginsburg's Laidlaw decision seeks to simplify the burden of proof that a
plaintiff must meet in a CWA citizen suit in order to establish standing to
sue. The statement supports a rule providing that a defendant's unlawful
excess discharges of pollutants, allegedly in violation of discharge
limitations in a CWA NPDES permit, will be considered, as a matter of
law, both to "affect" areas in the river and on the shores of the river that
are "nearby" the defendant's facility and also to lessen the recreational
and aesthetic enjoyment of the river and its shore by users of those
nearby areas.
Justice Ginsburg's opinion, however, does not provide any
indication of whether violations of the CWA or CAA, other than
violations of discharge or emission limitations in a CWA or CAA permit,
can be the basis for a holding that another type of violation (such as
violation of a water quality standard that is caused by a defendant's
126. Member Curtis stated both the distance between his residence and Laidlaw's facility
and the distance between Laidlaw's facility and the places he desired to use for recreational
purposes. ld at 181-82. Member Patterson referred to the distance between her home and
Laidlaw's facility and also stated that she would like to purchase a home "near" the river but
would not in part because of Laidlaw's discharges. Jd at 182. Members Pruitt and Moore
attested to the distance between their homes and Laidlaw's facility. Jd Member Lee stated that
her home is "near" Laidlaw's facility, while member Sharp identified the distance between
Laidlaw's facility and places on the river he used or desired to use for recreational canoeing. Jd
at 182-83; see supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text (describing these members' specific
allegations).
127. LaJdlaw, 528 U.S. at 181.
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pollutant discharges, or a violation of a monitoring, reporting, or recordkeeping requirement in an NPDES permit) can be considered to "affect"
areas "near" where a defendant otherwise lawfully discharges
pollutants. 128
Justice Ginsburg's opinion in Laidlaw does not explicitly state that
the determination of whether a specific location is part of the area
"affected" by the defendant's challenged discharge of pollutants should
be based, at least in part, on how close that area is to the place where the
defendant is discharging pollutants into a river. The opinion also makes
no references to the concentration of mercury (or other pollutants
discharged by Laidlaw) in any part of the river at or near places used by
the affiant members for recreational or aesthetic enjoyment.
However, if the determination of whether a specific place that is
used by a plaintiff for recreational or aesthetic purposes, is part of an
"affected area," is not required to be established by scientific
measurements of pollutant concentrations in that specific place, the
determination of whether that place is "affected" by a defendant's
discharges or emissions of pollutants into a body of water or outdoor
ambient air should be based, in part, upon a determination by the court of
whether that specific place is sufficiently close to the place where the
pollutants were discharged or emitted. In order to hold that a place is an
affected area, a court should find that the concentration of the pollutants
discharged or emitted by the defendant probably is high enough in or
near that place to cause the plaintiff to have a reasonable concern or fear
that the defendant's pollutant discharges present a risk to human health or
to the environment, and consequently lessen the plaintiff's recreational
use or aesthetic enjoyment of that area. 129 This "reasonable concern" test
128. Seediscussion infianotes 156-161 and accompanying text.
129. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149 (4th
Cir. 2000) (en bane). The court essentially followed this recommended approach to hold that a
plaintiff, who resided and engaged in recreational activities four miles downstream from the
location where the defendant discharged pollutants into a waterway in violation of discharge
limitations in its NPDES permit, established standing to sue under Laidlaw, despite not having
introduced scientific measurements of the concentrations of the pollutants in downstream waters
used by the plaintiff for recreational activities. Id at 163. The court held that the plaintiff
established recreational injury (from decreased recreational activities in nearby downstream
waters because of reasonable fear of the effects of the defendant's illegal pollutant discharges) and
economic injury that were fairly traceable to the defendant's illegal pollutant discharges, on the
basis of evidence that the same types of pollutants discharged upstream by the defendant had
been found in the downstream waterway used by the plaintiff, evidence that pollutants discharged
by the defendant could flow at least 16.5 miles downstream from the place of discharge (12.5
miles beyond the place used by the plaintiff for recreational activities), evidence that the types of
pollutants discharged by the defendant can cause adverse health and environmental effects, and
evidence that many of the discharge limitations in the defendant's NPDES permit were imposed
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is based upon Justice Ginsburg's holding in Laidlaw that the affiant
members established injury in fact by establishing that their reasonable
concern and fear about the effects of the defendant's pollutant discharges
caused them to refrain from recreational use ofthe North Tyger River and
to suffer "other economic and aesthetic harms."' 30
In some cases, a specific place used by a plaintiff for recreational or
aesthetic enjoyment may be so close to the place where the defendant
discharges or emits pollutants that the presence and effects of those
pollutants in a body of water or outdoor ambient air can be detected by
the plaintiff's sense of sight or smell.' 3 ' In such a case, a court can rely
upon the personal observations of the plaintiff to hold that the area
"affected" by the defendant's discharges of pollutants includes the place
where the plaintiff made these personal observations. 132
Usually, however, a number of factors should be considered by a
court to determine if a specific place used by a plaintiff for recreational
or aesthetic enjoyment is sufficiently close enough to the place where the
defendant discharges pollutants into a body of water or emits pollutants
into outdoor ambient air. The factors allow the court to conclude
reasonably that pollutant concentrations probably are high enough at or
near that place to cause the plaintiff to have a reasonable concern about
the health or environmental risks of these pollutants.
In the case of pollutants discharged into a river or stream from a
facility located on the banks, the concentration of the discharged
pollutants in any particular part of the river or stream downstream from
the place of discharge will depend, in part, upon the volume and
concentration of the pollutants in the discharges from the defendant's
facility, the flow rate of the river or stream at the place where pollutants
are discharged, and the amounts and types of pollutants that are
discharged into the river or stream by other persons from other facilities.
In addition, when pollutants are discharged into a river or stream, even on
a continuous basis, the concentration of those pollutants will decrease the
farther downstream the discharged pollutants travel as additional
amounts of water from runoff and tributaries flow into the river or
stream. Pollution concentrations may also decrease continuously the
in order to achieve a particular water quality. ld at 157-59. The court concluded that "[c]itizens
may thus rely on circumstantial evidence such as proximity to polluting sources, predictions of
discharge influence, and past pollution to prove both injury in fact and traceability." Jd at 163.
130. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 183-84; see discussion infTa notes 165-167, 187-218 and
accompanying text.
131. In Laidlaw, Justice Ginsburg noted that affiant member Kenneth Lee Curtis had
attested in affidavits that the North Tyger River "looked and smelled polluted." 528 U.S. at 181.
132. Seeid
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farther downstream the discharged pollutants are carried by the river or
stream as some of the discharged pollutants evaporate, settle to the
bottom or are removed from the water by fish, wildlife, or plants
ingesting water. The addition of more water to a river or stream dilutes
the concentration of pollutants previously discharged and the removal of
some of the discharged pollutants further dilutes the concentration of the
discharged pollutants.
Of course, no significant amounts of pollutants discharged into a
river or stream should be found in waters that are upstream from the
place where the pollutants were discharged. The upstream areas in or
near the river or stream usually will not be an area "affected" by a
downstream discharge of pollutants, unless the upstream area is adjacent
to or near the place of discharge (so that persons using these upstream
areas have lessened aesthetic or recreational enjoyment of these upstream
areas as a result of their viewing or smelling the defendant's pollutant
discharges).
When pollutants are discharged, even on a continuous basis, into a
lake, bay or coastal ocean waters (rather than into a flowing river or
stream), the concentration of those discharged pollutants in any particular
part of the receiving body of water depends upon several factors, such as
the volume and concentration of the discharges in the wastewater from
the defendant's facility, the volume of the water in the receiving body of
water, the flow rate of water into and out of the receiving body of water,
and the amounts of that type of pollutant being discharged into the
receiving body of water by other persons. As a general rule, however, the
concentration of the discharged pollutants should decrease the farther the
pollutants travel from the point of discharge because the pollutants will
be dispersed into larger volumes of water after discharge and some of the
discharged pollutants may evaporate, settle to the bottom or be removed
from the water by fish, wildlife, or plants. Consequently, the farther a
place in or near a lake, bay or coastal waters is from the place where the
pollutants were discharged, the less likely that a court will hold that place
to be part of the area "affected" by the defendant's discharges. However,
currents in a lake, bay or ocean coastal waters may affect the way in
which discharged pollutants are dispersed in the receiving body of water,
so some areas of such receiving bodies of water may have higher
concentrations of discharged pollutants resulting from currents
transporting pollutants.
When pollutants are emitted into the outdoor ambient air, even on a
continuous basis, the concentration of those emitted pollutants in the
outdoor ambient air should decrease the farther the pollutants travel from
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the facility that emitted the pollutants, as the pollutants disperse through
greater volumes of outdoor ambient air and as some of those pollutants
fall or precipitate back to earth. However, the concentration of a
particular type of pollutant in a particular area's outdoor ambient air, after
that type of pollutant has been emitted elsewhere from a particular
facility, also will depend upon the height above ground at which
pollutants are emitted from the facility into the outdoor ambient air (from
a smokestack, vent or pipe), topographical characteristics of the area
(such as mountains that may block the dispersion and transport of the
pollutants), emissions of the same type of pollutant into the same air shed
from other facilities, and prevailing winds.
However, when pollutants emitted from a particular facility are
continuously dispersed downwind by prevailing winds, areas that are
upwind from the facility that emitted those pollutants should not have
significant concentrations of those pollutants in the ambient air.
Consequently, such upwind areas should not be considered to be
"affected" by emissions from a facility located downwind, unless the
upwind area is adjacent to or near the place where the emissions occur
(so that persons using those upwind areas have lessened aesthetic or
recreational enjoyment of the upwind area as a result of their viewing or
smelling the defendant's emission of pollutants).
As a general rule, as the distance increases between a particular
geographical location and the place from where a defendant's challenged
activity discharges pollutants into a surface body of water (or emits
pollutants into the outdoor ambient air), the concentration of those
discharged or emitted pollutants in the receiving body of water or
ambient air should decrease continuously, becoming much lower than the
pollutant concentration in the original discharge or emission. The
concentration of the type of pollutant discharged or emitted may become
so low in the outdoor air or water, at a specific distant location far from
the place where the discharge or emission occurred, that either the
presence of that pollutant may not be detected scientifically in any
measurable amount, or the low amounts of the pollutant at a distant place
may be found not to cause or threaten any harm to the environment or
public health. In such a case, the distant location should not be
considered to be an area "affected" by the defendant's discharges or
emissions of pollutants at a distant facility.
In LElidlaw, the most distant area affected by Laidlaw's pollutant
discharges was forty miles away from Laidlaw's facility (where member
Norman Sharp canoed forty miles downstream from the Laidlaw
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facility.) 133 However, in other cases with different factual situations, a
part of a river more than forty miles downstream from a defendant's
facility that discharges pollutants into a river may be considered to be
"affected" if that type of pollutant is found in measurable amounts in
water that far downstream and those amounts lessen the aesthetic or
recreational enjoyment of users of that area. Conversely, there may be
other factual situations where a part of a river closer than forty miles
downstream from a defendant's polluting facility is found not to be an
area "affected" by the defendant's pollutant discharges. This may occur
because the concentration of those pollutants in that part of the river
either is so low as not to be detectable in any measurable amount or is so
low as not to be harmful to human health or the environment.
In cases where a plaintiff seeks standing to sue on the basis of
recreational or aesthetic uses of a river that occur very far downstream
from the place where the defendant's pollutant discharges occur, a court
will have to decide not only if the plaintiff's downstream use occurs
within the area "affected" by the defendant's pollutant discharges, but
also whether the plaintiff satisfied the "fairly traceable" element of
federal standing to sue requirements. This "fairly traceable" element
requires a plaintiff to establish that there is a causal connection between
the plaintiff's alleged injury in fact and the defendant's challenged
pollutant discharges. 134 This element establishes that the plaintiff's injury
is "fairly traceable" to the challenged activity of the defendant and is not
the result of the independent action of some third person not before the
court. 135
Justice Ginsburg's opinion in Laidlaw does not discuss whether the
plaintiffs' affiant members satisfied the "fairly traceable" standing
requirement. Nonetheless, a number of federal courts of appeals have
held that the "fairly traceable" element is satisfied in a CWA citizen suit,
against a defendant who is shown to have discharged a particular type of
pollutant in violation of discharge limitations in its NPDES permit, when
the plaintiff shows both (1) that the pollutants are discharged into a
waterway in which the plaintiff has a recreational or aesthetic interest that
is or may be adversely affected by that type of pollutant and (2) that that
type of pollutant causes or contributes to the kinds of injuries alleged by
the plaintiff. 136 Under this standard, a plaintiff can sue any person who is
133. Id at 183.
134. See Lujan v. Defenders ofWildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
135. ld
136. See, e.g., Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Powell Duffiyn Terminals, Inc.,
913 F.2d 64, 72 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. demed, 498 U.S. 1109 (1991 ); Sierra Club v. Cedar Point Oil

2003]

STANDING TO SUE IN CITIZEN SUITS

91

discharging that particular type of pollutant into a water body, even when
there are several persons doing so, and can establish standing to sue by
showing that the person sued has caused "some part" of the injury
suffered by the plaintiff.' 37
Under this approach, the "fairly traceable" element is satisfied by
evidence establishing that the body of water in which, or near where, the
plaintiff engages in recreational activity, has been adversely affected in a
manner that can be caused by the types of pollutants discharged by the
defendant, without a need to show that each type of pollutant discharged
by the defendant by itself has caused specific recreational or aesthetic
injury to the plaintiff. For example, the "fairly traceable" element was
held as satisfied when (1) the collective effects of a defendant's
discharges of several different types of pollutants, in unlawful quantities
in violation of several different effluent limitation parameters in its
NPDES permit, interfered with the plaintiffs' fishing, swimming, and
other recreational activities in and near the place where the defendant
discharged pollutants (because of the unpleasant appearance and odors of
the pollution) and (2) an expert witness for the plaintiffs testified that the
effluents discharged by the defendant "may poison fish, render areas
unsafe for people to swim, and generally limit the river as a fertile
ground for recreation," without the need for "proof of this nature ... with
respect to each individual parameter." 138
Additionally, the fairly traceable element was satisfied when a
plaintiff's affiants, who engaged in recreational activities on the shores of
a "heavily industrialized" stream within several miles of where the
defendant discharged oil and grease into the stream in violation of
discharge limitations in its NPDES permit, stated that the nearby waters
of the stream had an oily or greasy sheen, thus permitting the court to
conclude that the aesthetic injury suffered by the affiants "may be fairly
traced to [the defendant's] effluent." 139 On the other hand, "if a plaintiff
has alleged ... that the waterway is unable to support aquatic life . . . ,
but failed to show that defendant's effluent contains pollutants that harm
aquatic life, then plaintiffs would lack standing." 140
These courts of appeal adopted this approach on the grounds that
the "fairly traceable" element does not require a plaintiff to "show to a
Co., 73 E3d 546, 557 (5th Cir. 1996); Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Watkins, 954 E2d 974,
980 (4th Cir. 1992).
137. Powell Dufliyn Tennina/s, 913 E2d at 72 n.8.
138. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Texaco Ref. & Mktg., Inc., 2 F.3d 493, 505 (3d Cir.
1993).
139. Powell Dufliyn Terminals, 913 E2d at 71-73 n.8.
140. Jd at 72-73 n.8 (dictum).
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scientific certainty that defendant's effluent, and defendant's effluent
4
alone, caused the precise harm suffered by the plaintiffs,"' ' because "[i]f
scientific certainty were the standard, then plaintiffs would be required to
supply costly, strict proof of causation to meet a threshold jurisdictional
requirement--even where ... the asserted cause of action [a defendant's
alleged violation of discharge limitations in its CWA NPDES permit]
142
does not itself require such proof."
This approach, however, may not be appropriate when the body of
water into which the defendant discharges pollutants is so very large
"that plaintiffs should rightfully demonstrate a more specific geographic
or other causative nexus in order to satisfy the 'fairly traceable' element
of standing."' 43 Also, the approach would not be appropriate when the
defendant discharges pollutants into a body of water that is not the water
body used by the plaintiff for recreational activities and that does not
44
have a direct hydrologic connection to that body of water.'
The type of CWA or CAA violation allegedly committed by a
defendant not only is a relevant factor in deciding if a plaintiff in a CWA
or CAA citizen suit satisfies the "fairly traceable" element, but also is a
relevant factor in determining if a specific place is part of the area
"affected" by the defendant's challenged pollutant discharges or
emissions. As discussed earlier, Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion in
Laidlaw should be interpreted as requiring that the determination of
whether an area is "affected" by the defendant's challenged activity
should be based not only upon consideration of the distance between the
place where the defendant's facility discharges pollutants and the place
used by the plaintiff for recreational or aesthetic enjoyment, but also
should be based upon the type of violation of the CWA or CAA allegedly
committed by the defendant. 145

141. Id at 72; Natural Res. De£ Council, Inc., 954 F.2d at 980.
142. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F. 3d 149, 161 (4th
Cir. 2000) (en bane).
143. Sierra Club v. Cedar Point Oil Co., Inc., 73 F.3d 546, 558 n.24 (5th Cir. 1996)
(dictum).
144. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 95 F.3d 358, 362 (5th Cir.
1996) (holding that a fairly traceable element was not satisfied in a case where plaintiff's
members used a body of water located three tributaries and eighteen miles away from the place
where the defendant discharged pollutants, when there was no evidence demonstrating that
pollutants discharged by the defendant made their way to the water body used by the plaintiff's
members). The court held that the plaintiff's members' injuries could not be assumed to be fairly
traceable to the defendant's discharges "solely on the basis of the observation that water runs
downstream." Id at 362.
145. See supra notes 122-128 and accompanying text.
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Justice Ginsburg's opinion implicitly holds, however, that an area
can be "affected" for purposes of the injury in fact principle without the
environment of the area being harmed or degraded. In the standing to
sue part of the Laidlaw opinion, Justice Ginsburg held that "[t]he relevant
showing for purposes of Article III standing . . . is not injury to the
environment but injury to the plaintiff." 146 Consequently, Justice
Ginsburg rejected Laidlaw's (and Justice Scalia's) argument, that FOE
had no standing to sue for either injunctive relief or civil penalties when
the suit was filed because the district court found that Laidlaw's
discharges of mercury in violation of its CWA NPDES permit caused
"'no demonstrated ... harm to the environment"' and "did not result in
any health risk." 147 Justice Ginsburg, in her majority opinion, responded
to this argument by stating that insistence upon injury to the environment
rather than injury to the plaintiff "is to raise the standing hurdle higher
than the necessary showing for success on the merits in an action
alleging noncompliance with an NPDES permit." 148
Justice Scalia, however, favored this argument made by Laidlaw,
asserting in dissent Goined by Justice Thomas) that "[t]ypically, an
environmental plaintiff claiming injury due to discharges in violation of
the Clean Water Act argues that the discharges harm the environment,
and that the harm to the environment injures him." 149 Applying his "harm
to the environment" standard to the facts in Laidlaw, Justice Scalia
asserted that the plaintiffs in the Laidlaw case could not establish injury
in fact for standing to sue purposes by the "typical" method, since the
district court found that Laidlaw's discharges of pollutants did not harm
either the environment or the North Tyger River and did not result in any
health risk and that the overall quality of the water in the river exceeds
the levels necessary to support recreation in and on the water. 150 Justice
Scalia conceded that "[w]hile it is perhaps possible that a plaintiff could
be harmed even though the environment was not, such a plaintiff would
have the burden of articulating and demonstrating the nature of that
injury." 151 He argued, however, that in the Laidlaw case, the plaintiffs, in
order to prove injury in fact to their members, should have introduced
"evidence supporting the affidavits' bald assertions regarding decreasing
146. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181
(2000).
147. Jd (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc., v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 956 F.
Supp. 588,602 (D.S.C. 1997)).
148. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 181.
149. Jd at 199 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
150. Id (citing Laidlaw, 956 F. Supp. at 600, 602-03).
151. Id at 199 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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recreational usage and declining home values, as well as evidence for the
improbable proposition that Laidlaw's violations, even though harmless
to the environment, are somehow responsible for these effects." 152
Justice Ginsburg's "affected area" test for aesthetic and recreational
injury in fact differs from Justice Scalia's statement of what he believes
to be the correct legal principle for recreational and aesthetic injury in
fact, by not explicitly requiring that the lessening of the plaintiff's
recreational and aesthetic values in the affected area be caused by harm
or changes to the environment of the affected area. Justice Ginsburg's
test, while requiring that the plaintiff's physically use an area that is
"affected" by the defendant's challenged activity, only requires that the
plaintiff establish that the defendant's challenged activity lessens the
aesthetic and recreational enjoyment that the plaintiff derives from that
use.ls3
Justice Scalia's test, on the other hand, requires that the plaintiff
show that the defendant's discharges harm the environment of the area
physically used by the plaintiff and that this environmental harm causes
injury to the plaintiff's aesthetic or recreational enjoyment of the affected
area. 154 Although Justice Ginsburg's test requires that the defendant's
challenged activity "adversely affect" an area used by the plaintiff, her
test does not require that those adverse effects on the affected area result
in adverse effects on the plaintiff's recreational or aesthetic enjoyment of
the affected area. Furthermore, Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion in
Laidlaw implicitly holds that an area used by the plaintiff can be
"adversely affected," within the meaning of her test for "injury in fact,"
even though there is no showing by the plaintiff of any harm to the
environment, injury or risk to human health, or "harm" to the "affected
area."
Of course, both Justice Ginsburg's test and Justice Scalia's test in
La1dlawwill be satisfied in a CWA citizen suit if a plaintiff can show that
a defendant's discharges into a surface body of water not only violate
effluent limitations in the facility's CWA NPDES permit, but also cause
harm to the receiving body of water or other parts of the environment
used by the plaintiffs, or adversely affect or threaten the health of the
plaintiffs, because such "harm" certainly would "affect" the area.
Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion in Laidlaw held that the
plaintiffs had standing to sue to seek both injunctive relief and civil
penalties in an action against a defendant whose facility was alleged to be
152. Id at 200 (citation omitted).
153. Id at 183-85.
154. Id at 199 (Scalia, J. dissenting).

2003]

STANDING TO SUE IN CITIZEN SUITS

95

in noncompliance with effluent limitations in a CWA NPDES permit. 155
This decision should be interpreted as implicitly holding that any
discharges of pollutants into a surface body of water that allegedly are in
violation of effluent discharge limitations in a CWA NPDES permit
"affect" "nearby" areas in the receiving body of water and its adjoining
shoreline, for purposes of determining injury in fact for standing to sue
purposes, even though those pollutant discharges do not cause a violation
of water quality standards or otherwise harm or threaten to harm the
environment or human health.
Similarly, emissions of pollutants from a facility into the ambient air
should be considered to sufficiently "affect" that ambient air to constitute
injury in fact to persons who reside, work or engage in recreational
activities "near," and downwind from, that facility (and who therefore
may breath ambient air that contains pollutants emitted from the
defendant's facility), when those emissions allegedly are in violation of
emission limitations in the facility's CAA Title V permit. Consequently,
under Justice Ginsburg's injury in fact test in Laidlaw, a plaintiff should
have standing to sue in a citizen suit under section 304' 56 of the CAA
filed against a facility that allegedly is emitting pollutants into the
ambient air in violation of emission limitations in that facility's CAA
permit issued under Title V 157 of the CAA, if the plaintiff is a person who
uses areas "near" (or downwind from) the polluting facility for
recreational or aesthetic enjoyment and if such enjoyment allegedly is
lessened by the defendant's emissions of pollutants into the ambient air.
A plaintiff should have standing in such a case even if the defendant's
emissions do not cause CAA National Ambient Air Quality Standards to
be violated in that area or region, and even though the defendant's
pollutant emissions do not cause or threaten to cause any other harm to
the environment or to public health.
In addition, a particular area's outdoor ambient air should be
considered to be "affected" by a defendant's emissions of pollutants into
that air if the defendant's emissions cause a violation of a National
Ambient Air Quality Standard in that particular area, even if the
defendant's emissions do not violate emission limitations in a CAA Title
V permit. Similarly, a part of a river should be considered to be
"affected" by discharges of pollutants into that river from a defendant's
facility located upstream, if those discharges cause a violation of a CWA
water quality standard in that part of the river (regardiess of whether the
155. Id at 189.
156. 42 U.S. C. § 7604 (2000).
157. Id §§ 7661-7661f.
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defendant's pollutant discharges violate a discharge limitation in a CWA
NPDES permit).
However, Laidlaw does not make clear whether an area can be
"affected" by a defendant in a CWA or CAA citizen suit who allegedly is
violating monitoring, record-keeping, or reporting requirements in a
CWA NPDES permit or CAA Title V permit, but who is not alleged to
be violating CWA or CAA discharge or emission limitations or to be
causing a violation of a CWA water quality standard or CAA ambient air
quality standard. In such cases, an area may not be considered to be
"affected" by the defendant's "challenged activity" if the defendant's
"challenged activity" is considered to be the defendant's failure to
comply with monitoring, reporting, or record-keeping requirements, as
opposed to the defendant's pollutant discharges or emissions (which may
be in compliance with the discharge or emission limitations in the
defendant's CWA NPDES permit or CAA Title V permit). 158 However, if
a plaintiff in such a case is not considered to suffer recreational or
aesthetic injury under Laidlaws test for recreational and aesthetic injury
in fact, the plaintiff may be able to establish the injury in fact element of
federal standing to sue requirements on the basis of "informational
injury"-the failure of the plaintiff to obtain information which must be
59
publicly disclosed pursuant to statute/ which arguably would include
information required to be reported to governmental authorities and kept
in records, and to be made available to members of the public, by the
CWA 160 and CAA. 161
In the part of his statement asserting that "[t]ypically, an
environmental plaintiff ... argues that the [defendant's] discharges harm
the environment," Justice Scalia appears to require that the environment
162
be harmed solely by defendant's discharges of pollutants.
This
interpretation is supported by Justice Scalia's subsequent statement in his
158. See Sierra Club v. Simkins Indus., Inc., 847 E2d 1109, 1112-13 (4th Cir. 1988). The
Simkins Industries decision, issued many years prior to the Supreme Court's Laidlaw decision,
held that a defendant's violation of provisions in its NPDES permit, requiring it to monitor and
report its discharges of pollutants into a river, caused injury in fact to the interests of the plaintiffs'
members in protecting the environmental integrity of the river and curtailing ongoing unlawful
discharges by the defendant into that river. Id Simkins Industries may not be consistent with
Laidlaw, because it does not state how the defendant's monitoring and reporting violations
"affected" the area of the river or surrounding areas used by the plaintiffs' members that were
near the place where the defendant discharged pollutants into the river.
159. Fed. Election Comm'n v.Adkins, 524 U.S. 11,21 (1998).
160. 33 U.S.C. § 1318 (2000).
161. 42 U.S.C. § 7414 (2000).
162. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 199
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (2000).
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Laidlaw dissent, that if the river was in a polluted condition, "this
condition, if present, was surely not caused by Laidlaw's discharges,
which according to the District Court 'did not result in any health risk or
environmental harm.'" 163 If Justice Scalia requires a showing that a
defendant's pollutant discharges by themselves cause harm to the
environment, he would hold that a plaintiff does not establish injury in
fact where the environment is harmed by the cumulative impact of the
pollutant discharges of a number of different facilities, but where the
defendant's discharges by themselves would not be sufficient to cause the
harm to the environment.
Quite often, the quality of surface bodies of water or ambient air is
degraded by the cumulative effects of the discharges or emissions of
pollutants into the air or water by numerous facilities whose discharges
or emissions individually would not cause water or ambient air quality
standards to be exceeded or the environment or public health to be
harmed or threatened.
Under Justice Ginsburg's test, any person who recreationally or
aesthetically uses an area near a facility that allegedly is emitting
pollutants into air or water in violation of either a CWA NPDES permit
or a CAA Title V permit can have standing to sue in a CWA or CAA
citizen suit. The plaintiff could sue regardless of whether the defendant's
pollutant discharges or emissions by themselves are the cause of a
violation of a water or air quality standard in the receiving body of water
or ambient air, or of other harm or threatened harm to the environment or
public health. Justice Scalia's approach to injury in fact, on the other
hand, if interpreted as only granting standing to sue to a plaintiff in a
CWA or CAA citizen suit against a polluter whose pollutant discharges
or emissions by themselves cause water or air quality standards to be
violated or the environment or public health to be harmed or threatened,
would grant standing to citizens in CWA and CAA citizen suits only in
the most egregious cases of water and air pollution.
Justice Ginsburg's test for injury in fact, because it only requires a
defendant's pollutant discharges or emissions to "affect" an area used by
the plaintiff and to "lessen" the plaintiff's recreational or aesthetic
enjoyment of that area, grants federal court jurisdiction over CWA and
CAA citizen suits against polluters whose individual contributions to
water and air pollution problems may not be substantial, but whose
discharges or emissions contribute to adverse environmental effects
caused by the cumulative effects of the discharges or emissions of several
163. Id at 200.
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or even numerous polluting facilities. Her injury in fact test does not
require a defendant's pollutant discharges or emissions to harm or
threaten to harm either the environment or public health, and does not
require that the defendant's discharges or emissions by themselves injure
or harm the plaintiff's recreational or aesthetic enjoyment of the "affected
area."' 64
After stating that the sworn affidavits and depositions of members
of the plaintiff organizations "adequately documented" injury in fact to
those members' recreational, aesthetic and economic interests, 165 Justice
Ginsburg appears to hold in Laidlaw that the plaintiffs' members had
standing to seek injunctive relief because they established that they
would suffer future imminent injury in fact both through ( 1) their
statements that they were refraining from using the river and its
surrounding areas for recreation because of their concerns about the
effects of the defendant's pollutant discharges 166 and (2) their conditional
statements that they would use the "nearby" river for recreation in the
future if the defendant's pollutant discharges ceased. 167
This interpretation of Laidlaw would establish a new, additional
standard for recreational and aesthetic injury in fact that permits the
injury in fact element to be satisfied in a suit seeking injunctive relief by
a person who has neither actually engaged in physical use of the affected
area in the past nor alleged that he or she will physically use the affected
area in the imminent near future, based upon two aspects of the Laidlaw
case. The first aspect of the case supporting this interpretation is that the
members' affidavits and depositions, which Justice Ginsburg held
"adequately documented" injury in fact, attested to injuries both (1) from
the members refraining from recreational uses of the river and
164. In a decision issued prior to the Supreme Court's Laidlaw decision, the Fourth Circuit
held that
[t]o establish standing to redress an environmental injury, plaintiffs need not show that
a particular defendant is the only cause of their irijury, and that, therefore, absent the
defendant's activities, the plaintiffs would enjoy undisturbed use of a resource ....
Instead, to meet the "fairly traceable" requirement ... , plaintiffs must merely show that
a defendant discharges a pollutant that "causes or contributes to the kinds of injuries
alleged by the plaintiffs."
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Watkins, 954 F.2d 974, 980 (4th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).
Quoting from UiltkllJs, the Fourth Circuit similarly has stated that "[r]ather than pinpointing the
origins of particular molecules, a plaintiff 'must merely show that a defendant discharges a
pollutant that causes or contributes to the kinds of injuries alleged' in the specific geographic area
of concern." Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F. 3d 149, 151, 161
(4th Cir. 2000) (en bane) (alteration in original).
165. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 183-84.
166. /d at 184-85.
167. /d at 184.
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surrounding areas (because of their reasonable fears of the effects of the
defendant's pollutant discharges), and (2) from the members' conditional
commitment to future recreational uses of the river if the defendant's
168
discharges of pollutants into the river ceased. The second aspect of the
case is that Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion in Laidlaw does not
explicitly state that the injury in fact element for standing for injunctive
relief was satisfied solely by either the members refraining from
recreational use of the river (because of their fears about the effects of the
defendant's pollutant discharges) or the members' conditional commitments to future recreational uses of the river if the defendant's pollutant
discharges into the river ceased.
Justice Ginsburg in Laidlaw appears to have held that sufficient
injury in fact for injunctive relief was shown by the members'
"conditional statements-that they would use the nearby North Tyger
River for recreation if Laidlaw were not discharging pollutants into it." 169
Although Justice Ginsburg did not explicitly state that these intended
future uses established the injury in fact element for standing to sue for
injunctive relief, as opposed to standing to sue for civil penalties (another
form of relief sought by the plaintiffs in the suit), this interpretation
follows implicitly from Justice Ginsburg's statement: "Nor can the
affiants' conditional statements-that they would use the nearby North
Tyger River for recreation if Laidlaw were not discharging pollutants into
it-be equated with the speculative "'some day" intentions' to visit
endangered species halfway around the world that [the Supreme Court]
. . . held insufficient to show injury in fact in [Lujan v.} Defenders of
Wildhfe'' 70-which apparently caused the Court in Defenders ofWildlife
to deny the plaintiff organizations standing to sue for injunctive relief.' 7 '
In Defenders of Wildlife, the plaintiffs, who were seeking injunctive
relief that would extend the protection of section 7 172 of the United States
Endangered Species Act to species in foreign countries, were denied
standing. 173 The plaintiffs alleged that they intended "some day" to make
return visits to foreign countries they had previously visited to observe
particular endangered species. 174 The Court held that these allegations
did not establish the imminent future injury required to obtain standing to

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id at 182-83.
Id at 184.
Id (citation omitted).
Lujan v. Defenders ofWildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
1~ u.s.c. § 1536 (2000).
Defenders ofWildlife, 504 U.S. at 564.
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sue in a suit seeking injunctive relief. 175 The Court in Defenders of
Wildlife stated:
[T]he affiants' profession of an "inten[t]" to return to the places they had
visited before [Egypt and Sri Lanka]-where they will presumably, this
time, be deprived of the opportunity to observe animals of the endangered
species-is simply not enough. Such "some day" intentions-without any
description of concrete plans, or indeed even any specifications of when
the some day will be--do not support a fmding of the "actual or imminent"
injury that our cases require. . . . "[I]mminence" . . . has been stretched
beyond the breaking point when, as here, the plaintiff alleges only an injury
at some indefmite future time, and the acts necessary to make the injury
happen are at least partly within the plaintiff's own control. In such
circumstances we have insisted that the injury proceed with a high degree
of immediacy, so as to reduce the possibility of deciding a case in which no
injury would have occurred at all. 176

In his dissenting opinion in Defenders of Wildlife, Justice Kennedy
suggested that the majority was requiring that the members purchase
airplane tickets to Egypt and Sri Lanka in order to obtain standing to sue
to seek injunctive relief. 177
In Laidlaw, however, members of the plaintiff organization who
either lived near the Laidlaw facility (within one-quarter mile to twenty
miles away) or who in the past had engaged in recreational activities on
the river forty miles downstream from Laidlaw's facility, apparently had
standing to sue to seek injunctive relief based upon their allegations that
"they would use the nearby North Tyger River for recreation if Laidlaw
were not discharging pollutants into it." 178
In this holding, Justice Ginsburg made no reference to these
members having any plans to use the river for recreational purposes at
any specific date in the imminent near future, as Defenders of Wildlife
seemingly requires in order for a plaintiff to establish standing to sue in a
suit seeking injunctive relief. Justice Ginsburg apparently did not require
the Laidlaw plaintiffs to show that their members had concrete and
specific plans to use the river on specific dates in the future because the
members in Laidlaw were "nearby" the North Tyger River, as opposed to
175. ld
176. ld at 564-65 n.2 (citations omitted).
177. See id at 592 (Biaclanun, J., dissenting).
178. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 184
(2000). These members' standing to sue for injunctive relief also may have been based upon their
refraining from using the river and its surrounding areas for recreational activities, both at the
time the suit was filed and in the imminent near future, because of their reasonl!ble concern.s
about the effects of the defendant's discharges. See discussion infia notes 187-218 and
accompanying text.
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the plaintiffs in Defenders of WJ1dlife who alleged only that they would
travel "halfway around the world" '"some day."'' 79 She also may not have
required specific and concrete plans for future use of the river on a
specific date because the members' alleged future uses of the river were
conditional upon defendant Laidlaw stopping its discharges into the river,
an act that had not happened at the time the complaint was filed and
180
these members were deposed.
Laidlaw, therefore, might be interpreted as holding that a person
who resides "nearby" both the area affected by the defendant's
challenged activity and the site of the defendant's challenged discharge or
emission of pollutants, has standing to sue to seek injunctive relief
against the defendant's challenged activity, by showing that (1) in the
imminent future he or she will use the affected area for a specified
recreational use (such as fishing, swimming or boating) if the defendant's
challenged activity ceases and (2) he or she will refrain from using the
affected area for recreational activities until the defendant's illegal
pollutant discharges cease--even if the plaintiff has never used the
affected area in the past for that or any other recreational purpose.
The Laidlaw decision however, does not define "nearby." The
members described by Justice Ginsburg in her opinion in Laidlaw either
resided one-quarter mile to twenty miles from the Laidlaw facility or in
the past had canoed in the North Tyger River forty miles downstream of
the Laidlaw facility.' 8 ' Under Laidlaw, therefore, persons who either
reside or engage in recreational activities within forty miles of the
defendant's challenged activity, arguably have standing to sue to seek
injunctive relief against the defendant's challenged activity simply by
alleging that in the future he or she will engage in specified recreational
activities in the "affected" area, if the defendant's challenged activity
ceases, with no necessity to specify a particular date for such future
recreational activities and with no need to have engaged in that or any
other recreational activity in the "affected" area at any time in the past. 182
Apparently, Justice Ginsburg believes that absent proof of facts to
the contrary, a court can presume the truthfulness of allegations of a
179. ld at 184 (quoting Detendemofl*ldlite, 504 U.S. at 564).
180. Id at 179.
181. Member Judy Pruitt lived one-quarter mile from the Laidlaw facility, member Lee
Curtis lived one-half mile from the facility, member Angela Patterson lived two miles from the
facility, and member Linda Moore lived twenty miles from the facility, while member Norman
Sharp had canoed forty miles downstream from the facility. Id at 181-83.
182. In Laidlaw, members Kenneth Lee Curtis, Angela Patterson, and Norman Sharp had
engaged in past recreational uses in or along the affected river, but members Judy Pruitt and
Linda Moore did not allege or establish any prior recreational uses of the river. Jd
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person that he or she in the future will engage in recreational uses of a
"nearby" affected area if the defendant's challenged pollution or
degradation of that area ceases, if that person resides "near" the affected
area and within forty miles of the defendant's challenged activity and that
person states that he or she presently does not engage in recreational
activities in the "affected" area because of reasonable concerns about the
effects of the defendant's pollutant discharges.
However, if such a person has never in the past engaged in any
recreational activity in the "affected" area--or any other area, or if such
person's sedentary lifestyle or poor physical condition indicate that the
person is unlikely in the future to engage in any outdoor recreational
activities in the affected area--or any other place, a court might decline
to accept as true that person's allegations and sworn statements attesting
that the person in the future will engage in specified recreational
activities in the affected area if the defendant's unlawful pollution in that
area ceases.
Laidlaw, however, provides no guidelines indicating when
prospective future users of an affected area will be considered to be users
of a "nearby area" within Laidlauls holding, and therefore not subject to
Defenders of Wildlife's requirement that prospective future users of an
affected area must show specific and concrete plans to use the affected
area in the imminent future.
Defenders of Wildlife's requirement may not be limited just to
situations where a person simply alleges plans to visit an area in a foreign
country that is more than halfway around the world. The Court's concern
in Laidlaw and Defenders of Wildlife was "to reduce the possibility of
deciding a case in which no injury would have occurred at all" (because
the plaintiff's alleged future use was too "speculative" and "indefinite" as
to when it would occur). 183 A court, therefore, may decide that there are
other factual situations, including some involving alleged future plans to
visit areas within the United States, that should be subject to the
"concrete and specific plans" requirements of Defenders of Wildlife.
A court, in deciding whether a plaintiff alleging an imminent future
use of an affected area should be subject to Defenders of Wildlife's
requirements of showing specific and concrete plans, should consider not
only the distance that will be involved in the plaintiff traveling to that
area, but also should consider other factors that are relevant to
determining whether a plaintiff probably will visit the affected area in the
imminent future as he or she has alleged. Although a past visit is neither
183. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 565 n.2.
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185

sufficient by itself184 nor required to establish standing to sue in a suit
seeking injunctive relief, a plaintiff's past recreational uses of, or visits
to, the affected area should support the plaintiff's allegations if those
visits have been on a regular or periodic basis in the past that makes a
repeat visit in the near future a likely event.
Daily geographical proximity ... may make actual past recreational use
less important in substantiating an "injury in fact," because a person who
lives quite nearby is likely to notice and care about the physical beauty of
an area he passes often. . . . On the other hand, a person who uses an area
for recreational purposes does not have to show that he or she lives
particularly nearby to establish an injury-in-fact due to possible or feared
environmental degradation. Repeated recreational use itself, accompanied
by a credible allegation of desired future use, can be sufficient, even if
relatively infrequent, to demonstrate that environmental degradation of the
area is injurious to that person. . . . An individual who visits Yosemite
National Park once a year to hike or rock climb and regards that visit as the
highlight of his year is not precluded from litigating to protect the
environmental quality of Yosemite Valley simply because he cannot visit
186
more often.

However, if a plaintiff has never engaged in recreational activities in
the affected area because of reasonable concerns about the effects of the
defendant's pollutant discharges on the plaintiff's health, the plaintiff's
failure in the past to have engaged in recreational activities in the affected
area should not be considered a negative factor in determining if the
plaintiffhas established imminent future injury in fact.
In deciding whether a plaintiff has established an imminent future
use of the affected area, a court also should consider the cost that a
plaintiff will incur to visit the affected area in the imminent future, and
the availability of resources to the plaintiff to pay those costs. A court
also should consider any legal obstacles (e.g., visa requirements or
governmental travel bans) that might impede the plaintiff's efforts to visit
the affected area, and any logistical problems that the plaintiff might face
in seeking to visit the affected area in the imminent future (such as
difficult means of traveling to the area, particularly if extended hiking or
184. /dat564.
185. This is an implicit holding of Lai'd/awbecause Justice Ginsburg made no reference to
the affiant members attesting that they would again use areas in and near the river for recreational
purposes if Laidlaw's pollutant discharges into it stopped and only three of the affiant members
(Kenneth Lee Curtis, Angela Patterson, and Norman Sharp) attested to having previously engaged
in recreational activities in or near the river. 528 U.S. at 181-83.
186. Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 230 F.3d 1141, 1149-50 (9th Cir.
2000).
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climbing might be required in order for the plaintiff to reach the area). A
court also should consider the plaintiff's lifestyle and personal
characteristics in determining if the plaintiff is likely to visit the affected
area in the imminent near future. For example, if the plaintiff is a "couch
potato" in poor physical condition who has never (or not for many years)
engaged in outdoor hiking and camping activities, a court might decline
to accept as true that person's allegations that he or she will soon climb to
the top of Mount Everest (particularly if the cost of doing so by means of
a private expedition would be well beyond the financial resources
available to that person).
Justice Ginsburg in Laidlaw also held that the plaintiff organizations
showed injury in fact by establishing that the defendant's "continuous and
pervasive illegal discharges of pollutants into a river" 187 caused the affiant
members to have "reasonable concerns about the effects of those
discharges" 188 and reasonable fears that "led the affiants to respond to that
concededly ongoing conduct by refraining from use of the North Tyger
River and surrounding areas" and caused these "nearby residents to
curtail their recreational use of [the river and] ... subject[ ed] them to
other economic and aesthetic harms." 189 Justice Ginsburg held that
because Laidlaw's unlawful discharges of pollutants in violation of its
NPDES permit was occurring at the time the complaint was filed, "the
only 'subjective' issue [presented in the case was] . . . '[t]he
reasonableness of [the] fear' that led the affiants to respond to that ...
conduct by refraining from use of the North Tyger River and surrounding
areas." 190
Justice Ginsburg never explicitly explained why the court found it
necessary to find this injury in fact from the affiant members' refraining
from use of the river and its surrounding areas, when the Court
apparently already had found that the affiants had established injury in
fact for purposes of standing to seek injunctive relief, on the basis of their
statements that in the future they would use the river for recreation if
Laidlaw were not discharging pollutants into the river. However, she may
have done so because she found that imminent future injury in fact for
standing for injunctive relief was established by both the members
refraining from recreational use of the river (because of their reasonable
fears of the effects of the defendant's pollutant discharges) and by the
members' conditional commitment to use the river for recreational
187.
188.
189.
190.

Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 184.
Id at 183-84.
Id at 184.
/d
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purposes in the future if the defendant's pollutant discharges into the river
ceased.
Although the affiants' conduct in refraining from using the river and
surrounding areas because of the defendant's pollutant discharges can be
characterized as a past injury (which the Court previously held to be
insufficient injury in fact in a suit seeking injunctive relief),' 9 ' the
members' conduct in refraining from recreational use of the river and its
surrounding area also can be characterized as a continuing present injury
and as an imminent future injury, which are sufficient to establish
standing to sue to seek injunctive relief. 192
Justice Ginsburg may have identified this injury resulting from the
affiants' conduct in refraining from using the river and surrounding areas
until the trial court issued its judgment, at least in part to establish the
plaintiffs' past injury in fact that was necessary in order for them to have
standing to seek the assessment of civil penalties. The affiants' alleged
future injury, while sufficient to establish the plaintiffs' standing to sue to
seek injunctive relief, probably was insufficient to establish the plaintiffs'
standing to sue to seek civil penalties, because past injury in fact is
necessary to establish standing to sue to seek damages (and civil
penalties arguably are analogous to damages). Justice Ginsburg therefore, at least in part, may have noted the affiants' refraining from
recreational use of the river to identify a past injury to the affiants,
because it was necessary to do so in order for the affiants to have
standing to sue to seek civil penalties for the defendant's illegal pollutant
discharges that occurred in the past (and continued until after the
plaintiffs filed the complaint in the action).
Another possible interpretation of this part of the Lakllawopinion is
that Justice Ginsburg considered the members' conduct, in refraining
from recreational use of the "affected" area because of their concern
about the effects of the defendant's discharges, to be a future imminent
injury that helped to establish (in conjunction with the members'
conditional statement about future recreational use if the defendants'
pollutant discharges ceased) the plaintiffs' standing to seek injunctive
relief. Under this interpretation, the plaintiffs' injury, resulting from their
refraining from recreational use of the river and its surrounding areas
because of their reasonable concern about the effects of the defendant's
pollutant discharges, would be considered a future imminent injury that

191.
192.

See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983).
See Lujan v. Defender ofWi1dlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 n.8 (1992).
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helped to show that the members sufficiently established standing to seek
injunctive relief.
This interpretation is supported by Justice Ginsburg's statement in
Laidlaw, immediately after her statement that injury in fact was
established by the members refraining from using the river and its
surrounding areas because of their concerns about Laidlaw's pollutant
discharges, that "Laidlaw argues next that even if FOE had standing to
seek injunctive relief, it lacked standing to seek civil penalties. Here the
asserted defect is not injury but redressability."' 93 This latter statement
might be interpreted as indicating that the Court's holding, that injury in
fact resulted from the affiants refraining from recreational use of the
river, should be interpreted as relevant to the affiants' standing to sue to
seek injunctive relief, not their standing to seek civil penalties. This
interpretation also is supported by Justice Ginsburg's discussion of the
Court's holding in City ofLos Angeles v. Lyons, 194 which she referred to
as holding that the "plaintiff lacked standing to seek an injunction." 195 In
this part of her opinion Justice Ginsburg concluded that the plaintiffs'
members established injury in fact by showing that their reasonable fear
about the effects of the defendant's pollutant discharges caused them to
refrain from recreational use of the river and surrounding areas. 196
Under this alternative reading, the Laidlaw opinion is interpreted as
holding that the plaintiffs' members established the injury in fact
element, for purposes of establishing standing to seek injunctive relief,
both ( 1) because of their refraining in the imminent near future from
using the river for recreational purposes because of their reasonable
concern about the defendant's pollutant discharges and (2) because of
their statements that in the future they would use the river for recreational
purposes if the defendant ceased discharging pollut4nts into it. Of
course, Laidlaw under this interpretation might be considered as also
holding that the members' conduct in refraining from using the river in
the past established a past injury in fact that sufficiently established the
members' standing to seek civil penalties for the defendant's past
violations of its NPDES permit.
Justice Ginsburg's opinion in Laidlaw did not identify the type of
harm or risk of harm the affiant members reasonably feared from the
defendant's discharges of pollutants into the river. The affiant members
(Kenneth Lee Curtis, Angela Patterson, and Linda Moore) who allegedly
193.
194.
195.
196.

Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 185.

Lyons, 461 U.S. at 107 n.7.
Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 184.
Id at 184-85.
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would swim or wade in the river if it was not polluted, may have feared
adverse effects on their health if they swam in the river when it contained
harmful pollutants discharged by the defendant, although Justice
Ginsburg did not explicitly make any such finding in Laidlaw. The
members (Kenneth Lee Curtis and Judy Pruitt) who allegedly would fish
in the river (and who presumably might eat fish caught from the river),
also might have feared adverse effects on their health if they ate fish
from the river containing harmful pollutants-although Justice Ginsburg
did not make any such explicit finding in the Laidlawcase. 197
However, Justice Ginsburg did not explicitly hold that any of the
affiant members in Laidlaw suffered injury in fact because of harm or
adverse effects, or risk of harm or adverse effects, to their health. In fact,
none of the affiant members in Laidlaw alleged that they suffered injury
in fact because of harm or risk of harm to their health caused by the
defendant's discharges of pollutants into the river. No allegations of
injury to the affiants' health may have been made in the plaintiff's
complaint in Laidlaw because of concerns that proximate causation
requirements would make it difficult to establish the truthfulness of such
allegations if the defendant challenged such allegations of injury to
health in a motion for summary judgment.
But even if some of the affiant members declined to swim, wade or
fish in the river because of fear of harm to their health, or did not engage
in other recreational activities, such as boating or canoeing, in or near the
river, because of concerns about harm to their health, the injury that such
a member would suffer should still be considered to be an injury to a
recreational or aesthetic interest (not just an injury to health). This
conclusion should be reached because a reasonable concern about a
person's health would be the reason why the person declined to engage in
the particular recreational activity (that also might provide the person
aesthetic pleasure, as may be the case with bird-watching and many other
outdoor activities that might be characterized as a "recreational
activity").
Of course, there may be cases where a person declines to engage in
an outdoor recreational activity in or near a polluted river not because of
any concerns that doing so will result in harm to that person's health, but
because of concerns that the smell or color of the river's polluted water
will cause a particular outdoor recreational activity in or near the river
either not to be an enjoyable recreational experience or not to be an
experience that will provide aesthetic enjoyment. In such cases, such
197. Id at 181-83.
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person would also suffer a recreational or aesthetic injury in fact that
would be sufficient to satisfy federal standing to sue requirements.
Consequently, under Justice Ginsburg's decision in Laidlaw, a
person should be considered to have suffered a recreational or aesthetic
injury in fact when the person declines to engage in a specified
recreational activity in or near a river because of the defendant's
discharges of pollutants into the river, either because of reasonable
concerns or fears that the activity will not be an enjoyable recreational
activity (or will not be an aesthetically enjoyable activity) or because of
reasonable concerns or fears that the activity will harm or risk harm to
the person's health.
Justice Ginsburg based this "reasonableness of fear" standard on
Lyons, which she described as holding that a plaintiff lacked standing to
sue to seek an injunction against the enforcement of a police choke-hold
policy because he did not establish that he reasonably feared being the
victim of such unlawful conduct in the future, since there was no
evidence of recurrence of this unlawful conduct against the plaintiff or a
realistic threat to the plaintiff from this policy. 198 Justice Ginsburg stated
that Lyons' "'subjective apprehensions' that such a recurrence would
even take place were not enough to support standing." 199 She then held in
Laidlaw that under Lyons the only subjective issue in the case was the
reasonableness of the affiants' fears and that the Court in Laidlaw found
nothing "'improbable' about the proposition that a company's continuous
and pervasive illegal discharges of pollutants into a river would cause
nearby residents to curtail their recreational use of that waterway and
would subject them to other economic and aesthetic harms."200 She
concluded by stating that "[t]he proposition is entirely reasonable, the
District Court found it was true in this case, and that is enough for injury
in fact." 201
Justice Ginsburg did not state that the affiant members, in order to
establish a reasonable concern or fear· about the effects of Laidlaw's
pollutant discharges, had to establish either that they had specific
knowledge of the types and amount of pollutants being discharged by the
Laidlaw facility, or that they had a reasonable belief that Laidlaw's
pollutant discharges were in violation of discharge limitations in
Laidlaw's CWA NPDES permit. Affiant member Kenneth Lee Curtis
only attested that "he was concerned that the water [in the river] was
198.
199.
200.
201.

Lyons, 461 U.S. at 107-08.
Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 184 (quoting Lyons, 461 U.S. at 108 n.8).
Id
Id at 184-85.
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polluted by Laidlaw's discharges," and that he did not fish "at a specific
spot [in the river] . . . because of his concerns about Laidlaw's
discharges." 202 Affiant member Angela Patterson stated that she would
like to engage in various recreational activities "in or near the river
because she was concerned about harmful effects from discharged
pollutants; and that she and her husband would like to purchase a home
near the river but did not intend to do so, in part because of Laidlaw's
discharges."203 Affiant member Judy Pruitt similarly averred that she
would like to engage in various recreational activities along the river "but
has refrained from those activities because of the discharges."204 Affiant
member Linda Moore similarly attested that she would engage in a
number of different types of recreational activities "were it not for her
concerns about illegal discharges." 205 However, none of the affiant
members described by Justice Ginsburg referred either to mercury or any
other specific type of pollutant allegedly discharged by Laidlaw, or stated
that they believed that Laidlaw's discharges were in violation of
discharge limitations in its CWA NPDES permit. Although affiant
member Moore referred to "illegal discharges," her statements do not
indicate either that she was referring to the defendant's discharges as
being illegal or why she believed that the discharges were illegal. 206 The
other five affiant members, who were held to have established injury in
fact, made no references to "illegal" discharges by the defendant.
Consequently, a person, in order to establish recreational or
aesthetic injury in fact under Laidlaw, apparently only needs to allege
and establish that they have general knowledge that the defendant in a
CWA citizen suit is discharging some type(s) of pollutant(s) into a river
or other body of water and that they do not engage in recreational
activities in or near that body of water because of concern about the
effects of those pollutant discharges on their health or aesthetic or
recreational enjoyment if she did engage in such activities.
In dissent, Justice Scalia in Laidlaw asserted that "[ o]ngoing
'concerns' about the environment are not enough [to show injury in fact],
for '[i]t is the realiry-ofthe threat of repeated injury that is relevant to the
standing inquiry, not the plaintiff's subjective apprehensions."' 207 The
"reality of the threat" language quoted by Justice Scalia in this statement
202. Id at 182.
203. Id
204. Id
205. Id
206. Id
207. Id at 199 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95,
107 n.8 (1983)).
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comes from a footnote in Lyons that is the same source of Justice
Ginsburg's "reasonableness of [the] fear" standard upon which she relied
to hold that the affiant members established recreational and aesthetic
injury in fact by showing that they refrained from recreational use of the
river and surrounding areas because of their reasonable fears and
concerns about the effects of the defendant's discharges of pollutants into
the river. 208
Justice Scalia's dissent does not oppose the application of a test for
recreational and aesthetic injury in fact that is based on Lyons, but rather
interprets Lyons as requiring injury in fact that is based on concerns that
reflect the true reality of environmental harm and pollution in an area,
when injury in fact is based on a person•s refraining from recreational use
of an area because of the person's concerns about the effects of a
defendant's pollutant discharges or emissions. Justice Ginsburg, on the
other hand, interprets Lyons as making the reasonableness of a person's
concerns, not the true reality of environmental harm and pollution, the
determinative issue in such situations in determining whether the injury
in fact element is satisfied when a person refrains from recreational use
of an area because of concerns or fears about the effects of the
defendant's pollution discharges or emissions. Of course, under Justice
Ginsburg's approach, reasonable people can disagree about whether an
individual's concerns about the effects of a defendant's pollutant
discharges or emissions are "reasonable fears" or unreasonable
"subjective apprehensions." Justice Scalia's dissent, in part, may be
based on his belief that the affiant members' concerns were unreasonable
"subjective apprehensions," not "reasonable fears."
This interpretation of his dissent is supported by his statements that
the affiants "rely entirely upon unsupported and unexplained affidavit
allegations of 'concern"'209 and "have established nothing but 'subjective
apprehensions."'210 He first noted that although affiant member Moore

208. /d at 184 (quoting Lyons, 461 U.S. at I 07 n.8). The footnote in Lyons upon which
both Justice Ginsburg and Justice Scalia relied states:
Lyons alleged that he feared he would be choked in any future encounter with the
police. The reasonableness of Lyons' fear is dependent upon the likelihood of a
recurrence of the allegedly unlawful conduct. It is the reali(Y of the threat of repeated
injury that is relevant to the standing inquiry, not the plaintiff's subjective
apprehensions. The emotional consequences of a prior act simply are not a sufficient
basis for an injunction absent a real and immediate threat of future injury by the
defendant.
461 U.S. at 107 n.8.
209. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 200 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
210. /dat201.
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stated that she would use the river for recreation if she was not concerned
about the pollution, she also had only been to the river twice (once before
the suit was filed and once afterwards). 211 Similarly, Justice Scalia noted
that affiant member Curtis had admitted that he had not been to the river
since he was a "kid" and also had stated that the reason he had not been
to the river since then was not because ofpollution. 212 Justice Scalia also
asserted that although Curtis had claimed that the river looked and
smelled polluted, "this condition, if present, was surely not caused by
Laidlaw's discharges, which according to the District Court 'did not
result in any health risk or environmental harm."'213 Justice Scalia also
asserted that the other affiants only "established nothing but 'subjective
apprehensions'" in stating "either that they would use the river if it were
not polluted or harmful (as the court subsequently found it is not) ... or
said that the river looks polluted (which is also incompatible with the
court's findings)." 214
Justice Scalia also argued that although the district court found that
the plaintiffs had standing to sue in 1993, this initial conclusion that the
plaintiff had standing should be re-examined because of the district
court's later finding in 1997 that Laidlaw's discharges did not harm the
environment. 215 He contended that the Court in Laidlawwas "content" to
base standing on "'conclusory allegations of an affidavit,"' 216 which the
Court had refused to do in National WJldlife Federation. 217 Justice Scalia
concluded this argument as follows:
By accepting plaintiffs' vague, contradictory, and unsubstantiated allegations of "concern" about the environment as adequate to prove injury in
fact, and accepting them even in the face of a fmding that the environment
was not demonstrably harmed, the Court makes the injury-in-fact
requirement a sham. If there are permit violations, and a member of a
plaintiff environmental organization lives near the offending plant, it would
be difficult not to satisfy today's lenient standard.218
Although Justice Scalia based these arguments on the true reality of
the environmental harm and pollution in the area near the defendant's
pollutant discharges, rather than on the reasonableness of the affiant
members' concerns, Justice Scalia properly focused on a person's past
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id
Jd
Jd (citation omitted).
Jd at 200-01.

Id at 201.
Id (quoting Lujan v. Nat'! Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990)).
Nat'/ Wildlik Fed'n, 497 U.S. at 888.
Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 201 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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use of an affected area. This focus determines whether that person is
truthfully alleging either that she will use that particular area in the future
for a particular outdoor recreational activity if the defendant ceases
unlawful discharges of pollutants or that she has not been using the
affected area for a particular outdoor recreational activity because of the
person's concern about the defendant's discharges of pollutants. A court
does not have to believe that such allegations are truthful when the
person making such allegations in the past has not frequently, or ever,
engaged in such recreational activities in the affected area (or anywhere
else). A court in a particular case may find that a person, who alleges
that she has not engaged in specific recreational activities in or near a
particular body of water because of concerns about the adverse effects
that would result from the defendant's pollutant discharges if she did so,
in fact did not engage in such recreational activities in or near the body of
water because she does not enjoy such outdoor recreational activities and
does not engage in such activities even if given the time and opportunity
to do so.
Justice Ginsburg's opinion in Laidlaw did not discuss whether the
plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief satisfied the redressability element
of federal standing to sue requirements. This element has been held to be
satisfied in a CWA citizen suit seeking injunctive relief against a
defendant alleged to be violating effiuent limitations in its NPDES
permit, on the grounds that an injunction will reduce, at least in part, the
plaintiff's recreational and aesthetic injuries caused by the defendant's
illegal discharges, by reducing the pollution in the receiving body of
water. 219 A plaintiff in such a case "need not show that the waterway will
be returned to pristine condition in order to satisfy" the redressability
element. 220
In the final portion of the part of her majority opinion addressing
the plaintiff's standing to sue, Justice Ginsburg in Laidlaw held that the
plaintiffs' claim for civil penalties, against a defendant who allegedly was
committing an NPDES permit violation at the time the citizen suit was
filed, satisfied the redressability element of constitutional standing to sue
requirements, because potential sanctions of civil penalties both
"encourage defendants to discontinue current violations and deter them
from committing future ones," thus "afford[ing] redress to citizen
plaintiffs who are injured or threatened with injury as a consequence of

219. See Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Powell Duffiyn Terminals, Inc., 913
F.2d 64,73 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1109 (1991).
220. Id
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ongoing lawful conduct."111 Justice Ginsburg distinguished Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Environment, where the Supreme Court held that
citizen plaintiffs did not satisfy the redressability element of standing to
sue requirements in a citizen suit seeking civil penalties against a
defendant whose violations had ceased by the time the citizen's suit was
filed, on the ground that civil penalties for violations that have ceased by
the time the plaintiff's suit is filed do not redress any of a private
plaintiff's injury in fact. 221
V.

CONCLUSION

Regardless of whether Laidlaw is interpreted as a decision that has
"effected no significant change in standing doctrine"223 or as a decision
that has made a "significant change in environmental standing
doctrine,"114 or a "sea change in constitutional standing principles,"215 that
"has unnecessarily opened the standing floodgates, rendering ...
standing inquiry 'a sham,"'226 La1aJawclearly is the first decision by the
United States Supreme Court to address in depth the issue of how a
plaintiff can establish recreational and aesthetic injury in fact in a case
against a defendant who is either discharging pollutants into a body of
water or emitting pollutants into the outdoor ambient air.
LaJaJaw recognizes that a person can establish recreational or
aesthetic injury in fact by showing both (1) that he or she uses an area
"affected" by a defendant's allegedly unlawful pollution of a water body
or outdoor ambient air and (2) that the defendant's challenged pollution
of the water body or outdoor air "lessens" the plaintiff's recreational or
aesthetic enjoyment of the "affected" area. 227 Courts in future cases
involving air or water pollution will have to determine, on a case-by-case
basis, whether a specific place used by a plaintiff for recreational or
aesthetic enjoyment is part of the area "affected" by a defendant's
challenged pollutant discharges or emissions. Although the distance
221. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 186.
222. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S 83, 106-07 (1998). Justice
Ginsburg, in the final part of her opinion in Laidlaw, also held that the suit had not become moot
as a matter of law simply because the defendant achieved substantial compliance with its permit
after the plaintiff's suit was flied or because the defendant closed its facility after the plaintiff's
suit was flied. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 189-94. In this part of her decision, Justice Ginsburg
distinguished standing from mootness. Jd at 189-92.
223. Am. Littoral Soc'y v. United States EPA, 199 F. Supp. 2d 217, 231 n.8 (D. N.J. 2002).
224. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 165 (4th
Cir. 2000) (Luttig, J., concurring).
225. Jd at 164 (Niemeyer, J., concurring).
226. Id at 165 (Hamilton, J., concurring).
227. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 183.
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between the specific place used by the plaintiff and the place where the
defendant discharges or emits pollutants is a significant factor in the
determination of whether the specific place is part of the "affected area,"
courts in making these determinations also will have to take into account
the type of CWA or CAA violation allegedly committed by the defendant
and other circumstantial evidence that assists a court in determining if
the concentrations, in or near the specific area used by the plaintiff, of the
type of pollutant discharged or emitted by the defendant, are sufficiently
high enough to "affect" the area. 228
Courts applying Laidlaw in future cases also will have to decide if a
plaintiff has established that the defendant's pollutant discharges or
. emissions have "lessened," or threaten to lessen, the plaintiff's recreational or aesthetic enjoyment of the "affected" area. 229 When applying
Laidlaw to make such determinations, courts will face particular
difficulty in citizen suits seeking injunctive relief where a plaintiff alleges
imminent future recreational or aesthetic injury on the basis of the
plaintiff refraining from recreational use of an "affected" area because of
concerns about the defendant's pollutant discharges or emissions and on
the basis of statements that the plaintiff would engage in recreational
activities in the affected area in the near future if the defendant's illegal
pollutant discharges or emissions ceased.
Of course, a court does not face any such difficulties when a
plaintiff organization in a CWA or CAA citizen suit either alleges and
establishes (1) past injury in fact (for standing to seek civil penalties) on
the basis of its members' allegations and sworn statements asserting that
their actual past recreational use and enjoyment of an area affected by the
defendant's challenged activity was lessened in the past by the
defendant's challenged activity; or (2) future imminent injury (for
standing to seek injunctive relief) on the basis of its members' allegations
and statements that in the imminent near future they actually will use part
of the "affected" area for recreational activity or aesthetic enjoyment and
that their future recreational or aesthetic enjoyment of the "affected" area
will be lessened by the defendant's allegedly unlawful discharges or
emissions of pollutants. Recreational and aesthetic injury in fact clearly
are established by such allegations and proof of both (1) actual past or
imminent future recreational use of an "affected" area by the plaintiff and
(2) actual lessening of the plaintiff's recreational or aesthetic enjoyment
of the affected area when the plaintiff actually uses the "affected" area.
228. SeeidatJ84.
229. See id at 184-85.
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Laidlaw, however, now permits a plaintiff also to establish
recreational and aesthetic injury in fact even if the person has not actually
recreationally used the affected area in the past and does not assert that
she will engage in recreational use of the affected area in the imminent
near future, when that person establishes that she refrains from
recreational use of the affected area because of reasonable concerns and
fears about the effects of the defendant's allegedly unlawful pollutant
discharges or emissions and that she would begin recreational use of the
affected area if the defendant's allegedly unlawful pollutant discharges or
emissions ceased.

